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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the ties between biometrics and state security by analyzing 
biometric identification and screening programs, their structural elements, and ultimately 
their effectiveness.  Although biometric identification is rapidly becoming an 
international norm, quantitative assessments of biometric identification programs within 
the larger context of state and international security are non–existent.  This thesis 
discusses the idea of identity, defines the identity problem, addresses identity’s role in 
state security, and addresses how biometric identification contributes to this end.  
Individual characteristics of the most prominently used biometric identifiers are discussed 
in detail (face, fingerprint, and iris), as well as the overall concept of biometric 
identification.  The ICAO e–Passport program and the U.S. specific screening functions 
are presented to illuminate how biometric identifiers are used in practical applications.  
These programs, in turn, serve as the basis for the investigation of the effectiveness of 
biometric identification as it pertains to state security, focusing first on U.S. immigration 
and then on the broader context of international terrorism.   
Biometric identification has been largely credited with producing tangible 
security gains.  This thesis seeks to tie a quantitative measure to that assertion and 
generate future discussion about the merits of biometrically based identification and 
screening. 
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I. BIOMETRIC BORDERS AND COUNTERTERRORISM  
This thesis will provide some background and insight on the rapidly developing 
biometric screening initiatives currently being adopted by several states in an attempt to 
counter terrorism within state borders.  It will also attempt to assess the effectiveness of 
the biometric screening process by analyzing changes in terrorist activity by foreign 
nationals within nations that have instituted biometric screening programs to 
preemptively identify and stop individuals who may pose a security or terrorist threat.  
The intent will be to evaluate the effectiveness of biometric screening at national borders 
in countering terrorist activity by quantifying and comparing terrorist activity conducted 
by foreign nationals within select states as reported in the Global Terrorist Database 
(GTD.)1  Using these incidents in conjunction with data on selected biometric 
identification and screening programs, I will attempt to determine if there exists a 
correlation between the advent of state biometric programs and the frequency of terrorist 
incidents.  Throughout this thesis, relevant biometric programs will be explained and 
evaluated and the implications for biometrically based programs will be explored. 
A. WHY BIOMETRIC SCREENING 
Biometric identification techniques have been increasingly incorporated into 
national security and immigration programs with the intent of improving the screening 
process and serving as a verifiable identity check at national borders.  Many nations now 
incorporate biometric identification and authentication to screen and protect their 
populace from immigrants with the propensity to conduct criminal or terrorist activities.  
Biometric screening techniques may eliminate a dubious avenue that terrorists have used 
to access state borders by reducing an immigrant’s ability to falsify or forge an identity.  
Developing a method to assess the utility of biometric identification and screening with 
respect to immigration and border security programs will further this area of research.   
                                                 
1 The GTD is a product of: START - A Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, "Global Terrorism Database," University of Maryland, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd (accessed 01 
December 2009). 
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B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The ability to positively identify individuals is rapidly becoming a requirement in 
light of increased personal mobility within broader global communities.  Terrorists and 
criminals alike rely on the ability to remain unknown in order to carry out their nefarious 
activities.  These individuals often go to great lengths to conceal or falsify their identity 
by using multiple aliases to cover up past events and often provide false information 
concerning portions of their identity.2  Biometric identification is perhaps the best 
method to protect against identity falsification by conclusively identifying individuals 
based on their own unique physical properties. 
Verifiable identity allows states to ensure security and accountability despite 
transient populations, essentially by threat of holding “individuals accountable for their 
actions.”3  As reported in 2004, there were over 27 different nations implementing 
biometric identification and border screening programs.4  Since then, both common 
internationally recognized biometric screening programs and local variants are being 
rapidly expanded in several states.  International standardization is being provided by 
programs such as e–Passport, which provides the required technology, integration and 
standardization initiatives to facilitate biometric programs.  The e-Passport program is an 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) effort to implement machine readable 
visas (commonly known as passports) that can take advantage of “biometrics and their 
potential to enhance identity confirmation with passports.”5  The goal of e-Passport is to 
set universal requirements and standardization for “biometrically-enabled and globally-
                                                 
2 The 9/11 terrorists are a prime example of a group that used fictitious names to gain entry to the U.S., 
apparently a well-known terrorist tactic even before the 9/11 attack, see Thomas R. Eldridge, 9/11 and 
Terrorist Travel Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004), 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS53197. 
3 Kristin M. Lord, The Perils and Promise of Global Transparency: Why the Information Revolution 
may Not Lead to Security, Democracy, Or Peace (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006). 
4 C. Maxine Most, "Biometrics and Border Control: Beyond US-VISIT," Digital ID World (2004), 
http://magazine.digitalidworld.com/Sep04/Page18.pdf (accessed 04 March 2010). 
5 International Civil Aviation Organization, Machine Readable Travel Documents: Specifications for 
Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification Capability, 6th ed., Vol. 2, Doc 9303 
(Québec, Canada: ICAO Secretary General, 2006) (accessed 09 October 2009). 
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interoperable passports.”  Currently there are over 61 states participating in this 
program.6  In addition to internationally standardized programs, individual states are 
pursuing more localized biometric programs to include identification cards, border access 
cards and even programs that attempt to integrate civil and international criminal 
systems. 
The biometric recognition market in the U.S. alone is projected to consume $5.7 
billion in 2010, and most argue that the efficient use of developing biometric technology 
with respect to counterterrorism will greatly enhance immigration and border security.7  
State specific programs supplement the e–Passport system and provide enhanced 
screening based on biometric identifiers.  The US–VISIT program (United States Visitor 
Indicator Status and Identification Technology) run by the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) is one of several state run biometric initiatives that actively gathers and 
utilizes biometric information to identify and screen immigrants.8  Similar programs are 
in use in other states and biometric information is beginning to trickle between state 
governments in an effort to enhance both border and internal security. 
Positively and verifiably identifying individuals with the potential to conduct 
terrorist activity before they have an opportunity to gain entry to a state’s border, is 
crucial to reduce or limit the instances of foreign sponsored terrorist activity within state 
borders.  Historically, several agencies have worked diligently to compile information on 
individuals perceived as terrorist threats, yet, these often comprehensive activities suffer 
with respect to verifiable identification.  The main problem in terrorist identification and 
screening is that the typical information contained in most terrorist watchlists has been 
based purely on nomenclature.  Until recently, most agencies relied singularly on name 
recognition software to screen intending immigrants.  Biometric identification eliminates 
                                                 
6 Find Biometrics, "Over 60+ Countries Now Issuing ePassports," Security Document World Articles 
(2008), http://www.findbiometrics.com/articles/i/6390/ (accessed 04 June 2010). 
7 J. Ackleson, "Securing through Technology?”Smart Borders" After September 11th," Knowledge and 
Policy; the International Journal of Knowledge Transfer and Utilization 16, no. 1 (Spring 2003), 56. 
8 See U.S. Dept of Homeland Security, "US-VISIT Biometric Identification Services," U.S., 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1208531081211.shtm (accessed 09 December 2009). 
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the dependency on nomenclature and provides instantly verifiable identification to 
agencies that choose to correlate information and validate immigrants. 
The conventional wisdom and proposed hypothesis of this thesis is that instituting 
biometric screening processes in immigration services will directly support terrorist 
deterrence in that successful foreign national terrorist attacks within a country with 
“biometric borders” should decrease after the implementation of biometric identification 
programs such as e-Passport and enhanced screening initiatives such as US–VISIT. 
C. BIOMETRIC SCREENING IN CURRENT LITERATURE 
There appears to be an ample amount of information concerning biometrics and 
identification in existing literature, especially relating to security, counterterrorism and 
the potential gains from verifiable identification.  Despite the debated merits of biometric 
identification technology itself, however, there is a relative absence of works that attempt 
to document or quantify the effectiveness of implemented biometric screening programs.  
Existing works on biometrics and counterterrorism span the spectrum from technological 
breakthroughs and postulated merits of emerging biometric systems to the speculated 
civil rights and privacy infringements that could accompany state biometric systems.9  
This prominent range of printed and electronic media address identity, biometrics, 
terrorism, deterrence, and criminology yet none attempt to academically correlate and 
quantify the contributions of biometric screening to counterterrorism as a whole. 
In order to establish the foundation for researching links between biometric 
identification and deterrence with respect to terrorism, it is necessary to investigate 
biometric identification technology, system implementation methodology and other 
related avenues that may reveal the potential to “biometrically” counter terrorism.  There 
is substantial information concerning identity, biometrics, and their proposed use in the 
fields of criminology and counterterrorism but few quantitative studies on effectiveness.  
Aside from media and journalist reports that highlight individual successes, there is a 
                                                 
9 Kirstie Ball and Frank Webster, The Intensification of Surveillance: Crime, Terrorism and Warfare 
in the Information Age (London: Pluto Press, 2003); Louise Amoore, "Biometric Borders: Governing 
Mobilities in the War on Terror," Political Geography 25, no. 3 (01 February 2006), 366. 
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relative lack of research that focuses on the specific methodology or process of 
investigating biometric border controls.  This thesis will lay the foundation for the 
practical assessment of state biometric identification and screening programs by focusing 
on e–Passport and US–VISIT. 
1. Identity 
Literature on identity conveys that the need to positively identify individuals is 
rapidly becoming a requirement in light of increased personal mobility within broader 
global communities.  Biometric identification is premised on the identification of 
individuals by their unique and individual physiological characteristics.  Computers and 
digitization moved these techniques well beyond the manual analysis of fingerprints and 
sped the advent of electronic processing.10  Many existing works detail how this enabled 
more accurate fingerprint collection, storage, and analysis.  Other works detail how 
biometrics are used in digital facial recognition, palm readers, retinal scans, or even gait 
analysis.11  The preponderance of biometric based literature in circulation concerns the 
premise of biometrics or explores new techniques surrounding the field.  Few published 
works, if any attempt to analyze the biometric component of any of the screening systems 
currently used for immigration or border security.  The few that address newly 
implemented biometric programs are somewhat constrained government publications 
containing limited analytical data, opinion based editorials speculating success or 
failures, or journalistic pieces detailing specific publicized cases.  The following captures 
some of the important flows of information that can be garnered form the biometric 
literature that will be relevant to this thesis. 
                                                 
10 Myra Gray, "Terrorism and New Biometrics Technologies," Security Magazine 45, no. 11 (01 
November 2008), 80–81, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=35372561&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
(accessed 20 October 2009). 
11 Hong Lin and Jain Anil, "Integrating Faces and Fingerprints for Personal Identification," IEEE 
Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 20, no. 12 (1998), 
http://www.cse.unr.edu/~bebis/CS790Q/PaperPresentations/FaceFingerprintFusion.pdf (accessed 10 
November 2009). 
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2. Biometric Origins 
From fingerprints used well before the 1950s to emerging facial recognition 
software, a few works capture some of the new ideas on how to best use biometric 
technology to secure our nation.  There are ample sources that cover some of the first 
usable identity verification programs, mostly from a historical or fact based context.  For 
example, Watner and Sobieck highlight the utility of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBIs) Integrated Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), 
which contains over 500 million fingerprint images (the German equivalent contains 4.7 
million names, 2.1 million fingerprints and 1.9 million photos.)12  It is also commonly 
reported that several other nations such as China, Japan, Australia, the UK, and even the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) actively construct biometric databases for use in 
national screening programs.13  Although not fully developed or coordinated, the ability 
to rapidly recall, process and correlate stored biometric data using powerful computers 
will continue to improve with the advent of interconnected networks and the development 
of better techniques for “data mining.”14  The ability to integrate databases and quickly 
process biometric information will be crucial in harnessing identification material for 
screening immigrants and potentially for future investigations or prosecutions. 
3. Biometric Screening 
The inclusion of biometrics into the immigration and border screening process 
was primarily developed and implemented in the United States after the events of 9/11.  
At the time, the U.S. made a concerted effort to tighten security by initiating biometric 
                                                 
12 Carl Watner and Wendy McElroy, National Identification Systems: Essays in Opposition (Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland & Co, 2004); S. M. Sobieck, "Democratic Responses to International Terrorism in 
Germany," Contributions in Political Science. 340 (1994), 43. 
13 Dept of Homeland Security, "Government Agencies using US-VISIT," U.S., 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1214422497220.shtm (accessed 17 October 2009); John D. 
Woodward Jr., "Using Biometrics to Achieve Identity Dominance in the Global War on Terrorism," 
Military Review 85, no. 5 (Sep/Oct, 2005), 30, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=942160821&Fmt=7&clientId=119
69&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed 05 November 2009). 
14 Won Kim, "On US Homeland Security and Database Technology," Journal of Database 
Management 16, no. 1 (Jan-Mar, 2005), 1 (accessed 20 October 2009). 
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screening at our borders, as well as improving the ability of entry/exit tracking for all 
those visiting or immigrating.  The U.S. Department of State (DOS) and the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) are the two main agencies responsible for screening 
prospective U.S. immigrants, to include biometric screening at our national borders.  
Some of the most recent additions to biometric screening programs are the inclusion of 
full digital fingerprints, facial recognition software and streamlined database 
integration.15  These identification methods have the potential to identify individuals 
known to pose a threat to the U.S. and subsequently deny their entry.   
Several “biometric screening” programs are being adopted by states for border 
control and internal security.16  Some states are even considering national ID cards with 
embedded biometric identifiers.17  Unprecedented levels of interagency coordination and 
information sharing will be required for these programs to succeed, the US–VISIT 
program alone incorporates “over 20 databases” to successfully identify and screen 
participants.18  National fingerprint databases such as the Schengen Information System 
(SIS) and the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) databases are pursuing the means to 
integrate and share all available information within the European Union and even with 
foreign partners.19  This ability to access and search other databases to correlate data has 
already paid dividends in the UK by identifying and denying several intended immigrants 
with multiple visa applications.20  Improving control of the immigration process through 
                                                 
15 U.S. Dept of Homeland Security, US-VISIT Biometric Identification Services 
16 Anneliese Baldaccini, "Counter-Terrorism and the EU Strategy for Border Security: Framing 
Suspects with Biometric Documents and Databases," European Journal of Migration and Law 10, no. 1 
(January 2008), 31 (accessed 22 October 2009). 
17 Ian Hosein, "Transforming Travel and Border Controls: Checkpoints in the Open Society," 
Government Information Quarterly 22, no. 4 (01 October 2005), 594-625, http://www.sciencedirect.com 
(accessed 20 October 2009); Martin J. Garvey and Eric Chabrow, "Border ID System First Part of $10B 
Effort," Information Systems News, no. 971 (12 January 2004), 22, 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=17300298 (accessed 09 October 
2009). 
18 Amoore, Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror, 336. 
19 Baldaccini, Counter-Terrorism and the EU Strategy for Border Security: Framing Suspects with 
Biometric Documents and Databases, 31. 
20 M2 Presswire, "Ten Point Plan for Border Protection and Immigration Reform; First Milestone Met 
as Fingerprint Checks Go Global." Normans Media Ltd, sec. UK Government, 14 January 2008, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1412330111&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD 
(accessed 17 March 2010). 
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verifiable identify in the form of biometrics seems to be tightening immigration 
loopholes, which could otherwise be utilized by criminals and terrorists alike. 
4.  Deterring Terrorism 
Actively deterring terror seems to be the driving force behind many government–
sponsored programs aimed at increasing security, especially now that vulnerabilities have 
been exposed post--9/11.21  Although deterrence remains at the forefront of many 
government objectives and many security experts claim “deterrence works,” the ability to 
assess deterrence appears highly contested and very difficult to prove.22  The inherent 
problem is the ability to ascertain acts that have not, do not, or will not happen.  We may 
never know how many “attacks have been averted because of the measures the U.S. 
government has taken.”23  Without candid information on terrorist intentions, assessing 
terrorist deterrence seems to be a subjective assessment at best.  Despite the difficulty 
detecting deterrence, variance in the number of successful terrorist incidents may still be 
a strong indicator of the relative performance of biometric screening. 
Biometric capabilities and techniques in criminal identification are well 
documented; but again it appears very little academic research has focused on 
methodically exploring the effectiveness of biometric identification in countering 
terrorism.  Perhaps due to the relative novelty of biometric screening, most works have 
only focused on the technological aspects of implementation and the documentation of 
specific instances of biometric use.  Most of the current literature concerning biometric 
effectiveness is journalistic in nature and suffers from a lack of comprehensive statistical 
backing.  Several of the works centered on biometric screening analysis emanate from 
                                                 
21 John Frittelli, Transportation Security: Issues for the 109th Congress (Washington D.C: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, July 2005), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/52533.pdf (accessed 15 May 2010). 
22 Bianca Bersani, Paul Nieuwbeerta, and John Laub, "Predicting Trajectories of Offending Over the 
Life Course: Findings from a Dutch Conviction Cohort," The Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency 46, no. 4 (2009), 468; Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an 
Uncertain World (New York: Copernicus Books, 2003); David Bonner, "United Kingdom: The United 
Kingdom Response to Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (1992), 171, 
http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/09546559208427180 (accessed 23 October 2009). 
23 Kim, On US Homeland Security and Database Technology, 1. 
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media organizations and national governments and tend to reference specific or 
individualized successes or failures.  Examples range from local newspapers reporting 
immigration offences in the UK, which were discovered using biometric screening, to 
government-sponsored reports on the effectiveness of the U.S. border screening 
programs, which contain very few statistical data points.24  Other common works are 
often in editorial or opinion based format, such as the expose of the “20th hijacker” in the 
9/11 plot.25  It is apparent that the statistical data on biometric screening initiatives is of a 
somewhat sensitive nature that is not readily released as some U.S. authors have 
documented that their requests for data under the Freedom of Information Act are often 
met with resistance and fail to yield any real results.26  Considering the relative youth of 
biometric screening and the difficulty in obtaining pertinent data, it is understandable that 
few works attempt to correlate biometric data in relation to identified terrorist activities. 
D. METRICS TO ASSESS BIOMETRIC BORDERS 
In an effort to investigate and quantify the contributions of biometric 
identification and screening towards countering terrorism, this thesis will correlate, 
quantify and assess terrorist attacks with respect to the establishment of state biometric 
screening programs or “biometric borders.”  After explaining the current biometric 
identification programs and their components, this thesis will perform an analysis of U.S. 
immigration screening programs with respect to the incorporation of biometric 
information.  Specifically, it will look at the changes in the number of intending U.S. 
immigrants denied entry due to security and/or terrorist related concerns by comparing 
U.S. visa refusals in the category of terrorism and security concerns again with respect to 
the incorporation of biometric screening programs into the immigration process.27  The 
analysis will focus on the visa refusal categories that fall under the issues of security and 
                                                 
24 Louis Chunovic, "Stopping Terrorist Travel: The Pre-Flight 253 View," Government Security News 
8, no. 2 (01 Feburary, 2010), 1–23, www.gsnmagazine.com (accessed 05 March 2010). 
25 Woodward, Using Biometrics to Achieve Identity Dominance in the Global War on Terrorism, 30. 
26 David North, "At DHS, Perps have Rights that Citizens Don't," Center For Immigration Studies, 
http://www.cis.org/north/perps-have-rights (accessed 08 May 2010). 
27 U.S. Visa refusal statistics are tracked by the U.S. Dept of State and can be accessed at 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/statistics/statistics_1476.html. 
 10
terrorism as defined in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.28  Refusal figures in 
this category will be compared with respect to biometric implementation and also 
normalized over the number of immigrant applications in order to account for changes in 
immigration activity.  One limitation in the refusals dataset is that no information is 
divulged on the purpose or basis for the visa refusal.  This directly limits the ability to 
verify that biometrics played a role in the refusal process.  Thus, while biometric 
information cannot be directly correlated to the refusal rates, it seems that an increase in 
the relative quantities refused may imply that the U.S. is increasing terrorist identification 
capabilities due to biometric screening, if there are no other intervening variables in the 
immigration process. 
Building on this limited U.S. specific analysis, this thesis will move to analyze the 
first twenty states to implement biometric identification and screening policies.  This 
larger scale analysis will take into account terrorist incidents conducted within a country 
by foreign nationals before and after implementation of a recognized biometric screening 
process in order to determine appreciable changes in the overall quantity of terrorist 
incidents with respect to biometric identification programs.  The aggregate numerical 
analysis will be complimented by an investigative study of the correlations between 
biometric screening programs and decreases in terrorist incidents.  The ultimate aim will 
be to combine the findings from the quantitative analysis of terrorist incidents with 
respect to biometric borders and the assessment of U.S. immigration screening 
effectiveness after the incorporation of biometric technology in an attempt to draw 
conclusions about the overall contributions of biometric screening to countering 
international terrorism. 
The primary database for terrorist incidents will be the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism and published as an open-source product by the University of Maryland, 
which contains all terrorist incidents between 1991 and 2007.29  The GTD dataset 
                                                 
28 As per § 212(a)(3); 8 USC. § 1182(a). 
29 Available from: START - A Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
Global Terrorism Database. 
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contains global terrorist activity with over 80,000 attacks and provides the ability to 
classify individual incidents.  Classifying the dataset by perpetrator nationality and target 
location will be the primary method used to identify foreign nationals conducting activity 
against a specific state.  In order to isolate the screening process with respect to terrorist 
activity, incidents within the dataset will be qualified to only include events perpetrated 
by an individual subject to the screening process.  These events will only include terrorist 
attacks against a state performed by a foreign national who would have been subject to 
immigration or border screening.  Within this qualified dataset, events will be quantified 
and analyzed with respect to the implementation of biometric screening. 
One expectation with the implementation of a biometric screening program is that 
there will be some instantaneous benefits from identity verification and other benefits that 
develop over the course of the program as database functions become more developed.  
Results will be assessed with the understanding that there may be some lag before results 
might be realized due to the intense reliance upon database creation, sharing, and 
integration as well as the associated systems being distributed and operated effectively.  
This thesis will focus on the implementation of biometric screening systems as a 
delineator to discern any changes in terrorist activity or U.S. visa refusals, but it will also 
consider that benefits from such systems should continue to improve with time. 
Based on the nature and sensitivity of biometric screening information, few 
details that enable direct correlation with respect to terrorist attacks or visa refusals are 
released to the public.  In light of this, it may not be possible to show a strong direct 
correlation between biometric screening and terrorist activity within a state or by analysis 
of the U.S. visa refusal rates, yet certainly these quantifiable measurements should lend 
some assessment of current biometric screening programs.  Despite this, case studies and 
journalistic pieces that contain specific biometric screening successes or failures will 
continue to provide limited indicators of biometric performance.  These instances will be 
addressed where appropriate. 
Combining the quantitative analysis of terrorist incidents and visa refusal rates 
with respect to biometric screening with a program capabilities analysis and specific case 
studies should provide a comprehensive analysis of the merits of biometric screening.  
 12
With respect to immigration and border security, further research could provide much 
stronger correlation if similar analysis could be conducted at a level of fidelity where 
biometric screening information can be directly correlated with individual terrorist 
incidents or specific visa refusals. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be organized in a manner that will provide some background 
information on the topic of biometric identification, explain the specific programs 
currently in use for immigration and border security, then lead into the individual 
methods of analysis and ultimately draw conclusions from the results and provide 
recommendations for the future of biometric identification programs.  Chapter II will 
introduce the issue of verifiable identity, address why it is required, define the specific 
identification problems, and introduce how biometrics contributes to this end.  Although 
not intended to be a primer on biometrics in general, some detailed information on the 
field and related programs is necessary for the ensuing discussion in the following 
chapters.  Chapter III discusses identity throughout the immigration process and 
illustrates how biometric identification and screening is being integrated through 
programs such as e–Passport and US–VISIT.  It concludes with the analysis of the U.S. 
visa refusal rates as they relate to the U.S. biometric screening initiatives—essentially a 
small scale assessment of biometrics in immigration.  Chapter IV then launches into a 
much larger scale study of terrorist incidents as they compare to specific state biometric 
programs.  This chapter concludes with the results of this analysis and offers some 
suggestions for future analysis of “biometric borders.”  Finally, Chapter V ties together 
the capabilities of biometric identification in state security and border control by 
summarizing the results of the studies.  Based on this analysis, recommendations are 
provided for current and future biometric initiatives as well as possible assessment 
methods.  This section will also highlight the limitations of this thesis and provide 
recommendations for further research on the topic. 
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II. BIOMETRICS AND IDENTIFICATION 
The quest for verifiable identity is rapidly gaining momentum in today’s 
increasingly globalized culture.  In the wake of a perceptible increase in cross–border 
terrorist attacks, several states are turning to biometric identification programs for 
immigration screening and border control.  States ultimately desire comprehensive border 
control systems capable of accurately identifying and then denying entry to an individual 
who may intend to inflict harm or conduct nefarious activities within their borders.  
Biometric identification programs focus on identity verification, authentication, and 
screening using unique human identifiers.  These systems combine human characteristics 
with computers to positively ascertain then subsequently validate an individual’s identity.   
Biometric systems are continually expanding into state border control programs 
and many exert claims of measureable security gains as a result of this advanced 
technology.  In order for states to quickly solve the identification and authentication 
problem, biometric identification systems must be carefully designed and implemented.  
They must also incorporate or access comprehensive biometric identity databases.  This 
chapter will identify some of the problems with discerning individual identities and 
highlight the potential contributions of current biometric technology in relation to the 
immigration process. 
A. DISCERNING VERIFIABLE IDENTITY 
For the context of this study, identification and identity will be used to describe 
the process of associating an identity with a specific individual, often termed personal 
identity.30  In a social context, the ability to claim a unique and individual identity is the 
basis for relationships with other individuals, businesses, societal structures, and 
institutions.  In this sense, a personal identity is considered a unique attribute of which a 
single individual person is the sole proprietor.  In addition to physical identification, 
individual identities are rapidly becoming the basis by which an individual is verified and 
                                                 
30 Anil K. Jain, Ruud Bolle and Sharath Pankanti, eds., Biometrics: Personal Identification in 
Networked Society (New York: Springer Science+Business Media Inc., 1996), 1. 
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potentially trusted.31  The ability to develop basic social relationships, gain individual 
rights and services, and to a greater extent, functioning as cohesive society would be 
difficult to achieve without the ability to use our individual identities.32 
Our cognitive and visual abilities have led humanity to “visually” verify the 
identity of those within their immediate familiar surroundings.  Typically visual 
identification is based on physical features mainly through facial recognition or other 
distinguishable physical characteristics (height, hair color, eye color, structure.)  
Throughout the development of civilization, local knowledge of an individual’s historical 
upbringings and close social intimacy within communal societies made this possible.  
When people began to interact outside the immediate bounds of their local societies, 
validating one’s identity to other individuals became a necessity.  Identifying and 
authenticating personal identities is necessary in order to convey trust and facilitate 
exchange.  This increasing external interaction, outside the limited social circles in which 
we are able to be “visually” verified, has driven the demand for better methods of 
establishing verifiable identity. 
1. The Identity Problem Defined 
The question of verifying identity is widely viewed as a problem defined by two 
distinct issues—identification and authentication.33  These identification problems are 
often centered on determining exactly who a person is and somehow verifying this 
information through a reliable mechanism.  Jain et al., point out that the identification 
problem can often take on very different forms, from discerning an identity from a set of 
known identities to attempting to establish a new previously unknown identity.  Solutions 
to the first part of the identity problem have historically been in the form of names, 
birthdates, signatures, photos, or other items that we consider to be personally unique to  
 
                                                 
31 Stan Z. Li and others, eds., Advances in Biometric Person Authentication: 5th Chinese Conference 
on Biometric Recognition, SINOBIOMETRICS 2004, Guangzhou, China, December 13–14, 2004, 
Proceedings (Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2004), 1. 
32 Ruud M. Bolle and others, eds., Guide to Biometrics (New York: Springer, 2004), 3. 
33 Jain, Bolle and Pankanti, Biometrics: Personal Identification in Networked Society, 1–2. 
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an individual.  The need to interact without being physically present as well as the ability 
to convey trust and assurance of your identity has necessitated other methods by which to 
verifiably identify individuals. 
The second portion of the identity problem is identity authentication, more 
directly put this is the process of verifying the identification of an individual once their 
identity has been determined via an acceptable method.  Again this problem can take 
various forms, from confirming a known identity to comparing an identity against a 
comprehensive list of other identities, or screening.  Authentication solutions have 
traditionally been sought from either: something a person knows—password; or 
something a person has—token; but may soon be in the form of what a person is—
biometrics.34  Authentication can be used in a number of ways.  Most often in border 
control it is used to confirm that an identity either is or is not in a set of known identities. 
Solving the identity problem is a necessary first step in the immigration process 
especially as states look to protect their citizens from malevolent actors.  Each portion of 
the identity problem can be critically important to immigration, identities need to be 
accurately created and a method needs to be in place that offers reliable authentication.  
Screening is becoming an integral to the immigration process in order to properly vet 
individuals and protect states.  While many states often have similar methods for 
establishing identities (birth certificates or birth records) most have vastly different 
methods of authenticating identities (fingerprints, drivers license photos, national 
numbers, personal interviews, etc.)  Looking at the components of the identity problem 
and how it specifically relates to immigration can illustrate the utility of biometrics in 
solving the identity problem and bolstering state security. 
a. Identification 
The basic premise of identification in immigration and border control is 
that each individual person can ultimately have a unique identity that can be readily 
presented and verified in order to receive the desired service.  There are a range of 
                                                 
34 Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World, 182–183. 
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possible human identifiers that could be used in this process, potentially even a 
combination of identifiers that when used in combination, contribute to determine an 
identity.  Despite the identifier(s) used to represent an individual human identity, many 
researchers seem to agree with Roger Clarke that human identifier(s) must meet a 
stringent set of characteristics in order to fulfill the intended purpose of reliable 
identification.35  The following table lists the criteria set forward by Clarke for use in 
determining the suitability of human identifiers. 
 
Table 1.   Desired Characteristics of Human Identity Tokens. 
Assessing the criteria for human identifiers, it seems apparent that a 
nomenclature or numerical based system for identification will quickly encounter 
problems in the areas of uniqueness and indispensability, not to mention the security of 
such a generic identifier when attempting to put it into use.  It is also clear that more 
advanced and highly reliable methods of personal identification such as DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) genotyping are clearly too cumbersome and would not pass the 
                                                 
35 Roger Clarke, "Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public 
Policy Issues," Information Technology and People 7, no. 4 (1994), 6–37. 
Desired Characteristics of Human Identity Tokens 
Richard Clarke (1994) 













Every Relevant Person Should Have One 
No Two Persons Should Have the Same Identifier 
Should Not Change Over Time 
Should be a Feature Intrinsic to the Person 
Able to be Collected by Anyone on Any Occasion 
Storable in Manual and Automated Systems 
Able to be a Standalone Identifier 
Sufficiently Different from Other Identifiers 
Recording and Transmission Should be Simple 
Measuring and Storing Should be Cost Effective 
Relatively Easy to Measuring and Storing 
Conform to Contemporary Social Standards 
 
*Information  adapted  from Roger  Clarke’s  1994  article  in  Information  Technology  and  People  titled  “Human 
Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues.” 
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criteria for simplicity, convenience, cost effectiveness, or acceptability.36  In order to 
comply with a majority of these criteria, human identification solutions today often rely 
on the inclusion of several different identifiers (photograph, name, birthday, social 
security number, address, hair or eye color, height, weight, etc.)  Using biometric 
identifiers can offer significant improvements, particularly in the areas of uniqueness, 
permanence, exclusivity, and convenience.  Taking all the criteria into account, it seems 
that using biometric identifiers can better address almost all of Clarke’s desired 
characteristics of human identity tokens. 
b. Authentication 
The second part of the identity problem is verifying the identity of an 
individual once a suitable identifier is presented or obtained.  This has traditionally been 
based on the human ability to visually recognize individuals from photographs, or discern 
the accuracy of a password.  These methods required an individual to know or posses 
some sort of information or item to validate their identity.  Today, computer systems have 
increased the ability to repeatedly and accurately solve this part of the identity problem 
solely based on the individual’s biometric characteristics.37  As with traditional systems, 
there must be a method to first create the authentication devices and tokens and then a 
complimentary storage or database system capable of retaining and/or accessing the 
information in order to ensure valid authentication.38  Authentication methods can 
involve multiple approaches and may still incorporate tokens and/or passwords to 
ultimately accomplish the objective.  Although various methods can be combined to 
create different identification and authentication solutions using tokens and passwords, 
most traditional methods are subject to potential disruption via fraud, stolen or misplaced  
 
                                                 
36 The characteristics of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) and its unique ability to verifiably identify an 
individual were first discovered in the 1980s in the UK. Howard Safir and Peter Reinharz, "DNA Testing: 
The Next Big Crime-Busting Breakthrough," City Journal Winter 2000, http://www.city-
journal.org/html/10_1_dna_testing.html (accessed 15 May 2010). 
37 Stephen T. Kent and others, IDs–Not that Easy: Questions about Nationwide Identity Systems 
(Washington, D.C: National Academy Press, 2002), 34. 
38 Kim, On US Homeland Security and Database Technology, 1. 
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information, database disruption, security breaches, or identity theft.  Biometrics offers 
substantial security improvements to authentication through the use of an individual’s 
proprietary physical characteristics. 
As mentioned earlier, authentication can be positive or negative depending 
on the application.  Positive authentication is verifying that an individual is who they 
claim to be, while negative authentication is verifying that an individual is not some other 
known individual.  The authentication process in immigration and border control is 
commonly referred to as screening and is becoming heavily reliant on biometric 
identification.  Many states are now using comprehensive databases of known criminals 
or other “most wanted” types of individuals to accomplish effective screening at their 
borders.  An example of biometric based authentication would be individuals presenting 
fingerprints at a border point of entry (POE) and that print being subsequently compared 
to all the others within a database of “most wanted” individuals.  In this example, the 
individual is being negatively authenticated in that the agency or state is ensuring that he 
is not matched to any of the “most wanted” individuals. 
c. Authorization 
Some also add the term authorization into the identity problem.  The use 
of authorization is meant to be the privilege, item, or service that a person is attempting to 
obtain as a result of providing verifiable identity.  This addition is logical as usually the 
identity problem is being solved as part of a desire for the exchange of information or 
services.  In today’s globalized and highly interconnected environment; bank accounts, 
driver licenses, credit cards, online retailers, and even military installations all rely on 
various methods to identify and authenticate individuals in order to subsequently 
authorize a corresponding service.  Familiarization with these terms and understanding 
the associated problems can help navigate discussions about identity based transactions 
despite each individual application. 
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2. Vulnerabilities of Identity Solutions 
While most identity verification needs can be met using various solutions to these 
two identity problems—this system has some inherent weaknesses.  First, establishing an 
identity is a difficult problem that can be subject to error if either falsely created at the 
outset or maliciously modified.  Second, traditional methods of identification and 
authentication that make extensive use of tokens and passwords have a high potential for 
these items to be either stolen or used by “unauthorized” persons.39  Finally, very few of 
these traditional identity systems have the ability to be commonly integrated for the 
purpose of screening individuals.40  The existing vulnerabilities of the traditional 
solutions to the identity problem illuminate the need for a more secure, robust, and 
interoperable system capable of providing verifiable identity.  
Subsequent to the 9/11 attacks, it has become increasingly clear how terrorist 
operatives have been able to circumvent several identify creation and verification 
procedures.  These perpetrators, some already known terrorists at the time, were able to 
gain access into the U.S. through the immigration system by taking advantage of the 
multiple vulnerabilities within our identification and authentication systems.  Beginning 
with establishing identities, the 9/11 commission reported that “the 19 hijackers used 364 
aliases” to assist in gaining passports for travel to the US.41  It was also discovered that 
two of the hijackers had obtained passports that were stolen from the Saudi Arabian 
embassy.42  Two other hijackers gained entry to the U.S. with passports that contained 
fraudulent entry–exit stamps that were intended to hide travel to/from Afghanistan for 
terrorist training, illustrating how some well intended “tokens” can be used in a 
fraudulent manner.43  Finally, three of the hijackers were known to U.S. intelligence, yet 
                                                 
39 Jain, Bolle and Pankanti, Biometrics: Personal Identification in Networked Society, 3. 
40 Four years after the 9/11 attacks, several of the U.S. agencies failed to integrate or improve 
immigration screening capabilities.  See:  Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, Report on the Status of 9/11 
Commission Recommendations (Washington, DC: 9/11 Public Discourse Project, 2005). 
41 Eldridge, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States, 1. 
42 Ibid., 2. 
43 Ibid., 1. 
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were still able to successfully transit the U.S. border on multiple occasions.  This was 
mainly due to the fact that U.S. systems were not able to capitalize on the intelligence 
information already obtained by government agents and contained in “the terrorist 
watchlist.”44  Ultimately, the hijackers were able to falsify the creation of their identities, 
leverage stolen or falsified passports, and circumvent U.S. screening systems.  Looking at 
the 9/11 attack from the perspective of immigration and highlighting the areas where the 
perpetrators took advantage of the known vulnerabilities of the basic identity problem, it 
is apparent why the U.S. decided to address our immigration system and its traditional 
nomenclature based process of identity creation, authentication, and screening. 
Before biometrics, a state’s ability to establish individual identities and 
subsequently apply some type of screening process relied almost entirely on a 
nomenclature based system.  Individuals are assigned names at birth and these 
nomenclature identifiers are subsequently built upon by various institutions throughout an 
individual’s experience within the state infrastructure.  Most of this process relies on the 
addition of other human identifiers or pieces of information determined to be unique to 
that individual.  At the time that nomenclature was largely put into use, there were few if 
any systems that could credibly establish a quality baseline for the initial identification of 
an individual human identity.  This system of nomenclature based identification is a 
substantial vulnerability in immigration and border control, but can be substantially 
improved by the addition and incorporation of biometric identification methods at an 
appropriate time within the identity formation and authentication process. 
B. BIOMETRIC SOLUTIONS 
The ability to leverage our unique and highly individualized human characteristics 
in personal identification has long been practiced and is currently referred to as 
biometrics.  Biometric identification is essentially the practice of using a “physiological 
or behavioral trait that may be measured and subsequently identified in order to confirm 
                                                 
44 Eldridge, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States, 68.  
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an individual’s identity.”45  Through recent advances in computer technology and 
automation; the use of biometrics in human identification is now a very viable option.  
Biometric identification in immigration and border control is specifically aimed at 
reducing or eliminating the multiple vulnerabilities inherent in the identity system and 
enhancing the reliability of screening programs.  The ability to digitally capture and 
quickly compare complex and unique human characteristics allows states to capitalize 
upon human characteristics for verifiable identity.  The use of biometric identifiers is 
another tool that can be effectively used by state enforcement officials in nearly all 
security realms, including the current efforts of countering international terrorism. 
Biometric identification has gained momentum in the last decade primarily due to 
advances in technology and procurement, which spurned subsequent security successes 
by state and international agencies.  This section will illustrate the history of biometric 
identification, discuss some of the more common biometric identifiers used in criminal 
and immigration applications (facial photos, fingerprints, and iris scans) and show how 
biometric technology can substantially improve a state’s ability to solve the problem of 
identification and authentication with respect to immigration and border control.  
Understanding the characteristics of these biometric identifiers, the underlying 
technology that enables collection and processing, and some of the challenges 
confronting their use in identification is a necessary first step in determining the potential 
applicability of biometrics in security applications. 
1.  Biometric Basics 
Although the term biometrics is relatively new, the concept of using human 
characteristics to define and verify individual human identities originated early in human 
history.46  The 20th century, however, can be credited with seeing the most profound 
developments in using biometrics for identification and security.  Perhaps the first 
biometric tool to extend beyond the basic visual comparison method was fingerprint 
                                                 
45 Julian Ashbourn, Practical Biometrics: From Aspiration to Implementation (London; New York: 
Springer, 2004), 1. 
46 Ibid., ix. 
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analysis, which has since provided unprecedented gains in criminal identification.47  The 
subsequent integration of computer technology revolutionized biometrics by creating the 
ability to rapidly digitize, store, and compare individual identifiers.  Recently the field 
and study of biometrics has exploded beyond fingerprints and facial photos and is 
experimenting with identifiers such as speech, gait, and even odor recognition.48  In the 
continual quest for physically unique and highly reliable identifiers, researchers are 
looking towards the human iris, retinal wall, and even some highly detailed facial 
features.  Biometric researchers continually demonstrate that all these individual features 
have unique characteristics capable of being electronically identified with unprecedented 
levels of accuracy and reliability. 
The field of biometric identification is continually gaining ground as a viable 
alternative to the nomenclature based identity system upon which we previously relied to 
establish unique and credible identities.  As states pursue biometric identification and 
screening options to supplement established programs, most states have decided to use 
the most commonly accepted and least intrusive biometric identifiers of facial photos and 
fingerprints.  This has led to the creation of an international standard for biometric 
passports that includes facial photos, fingerprints, and iris scans.49  The ability to 
properly use these highly unique and accurate identifiers certainly has the potential to 
improve the reliability and portability of identification solutions that are now mandated 
by the unprecedented levels of global human mobility and the accompanying increases of 
state border transits. 
a. Facial Photos 
While not commonly thought of as a biometric identifier, facial 
recognition is perhaps one of the most highly used and least intrusive identifiers available 
                                                 
47 Jain, Bolle and Pankanti, Biometrics: Personal Identification in Networked Society, 44. 
48 Bolle and others, Guide to Biometrics, 55–59. 
49 International Civil Aviation Organization, Machine Readable Travel Documents: Specifications for 
Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification Capability. 
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to biometric applications today.50  Since the inception of photography, facial photos have 
been incorporated into several identification and authentication schemes.  The ability to 
use facial photographs for the purposes of identification stem from the unique human 
ability to rapidly compare a photograph to a live individual and assess the likeliness of a 
match with a relatively high degree of accuracy.  States and organizations both make 
extensive use of facial photographs in many identification programs, typically 
superimposing or embedding images upon a token, which is given to the individual user.  
This method is a prominent identification scheme currently used in driver licenses, 
military ID cards, and passports.51  The ability to digitize facial photos and store the 
information in a retrievable form (either in a central database or embedded within the 
token) has furthered the use of facial photographs as a potential identity screening 
mechanism.  Incorporating computerized recognition technology to the natural patterns 
associated with facial photographs has proven a bit more difficult, but is yielding 
progress as computers, imaging equipment, and software continue to develop. 
There are several methods currently available that attempt to automate 
facial recognition through the use of computer technology.  These various methods range 
from manual mapping algorithms based upon a grid type of system to complicated 
infrared identification schemes that rely on the underlying structure of the blood 
vessels.52  Although technology is proving that facial photographs can be a reliable 
biometric for authentication, they are also subject to problems in conditional lighting, 
facial expressions, capture device capabilities, and formatting; which makes this 
identifier somewhat troublesome for positive automated identification.53  
Understandably, the reliability of facial photos in identification goes significantly 
downwards as the visual or image acuity deteriorates.  As such, facial photographs are 
better suited for use in a controlled environment and mainly for lower security 
applications.  Despite some of these problems, consistent advances continue to be made 
                                                 
50 Simson Garfinkel, Database Nation: The Death of Privacy in the 21st Century (Sebastopol, CA: 
O'Reilly, 2000), 55. 
51 Bolle and others, Guide to Biometrics, 36. 
52 Jain, Bolle and Pankanti, Biometrics: Personal Identification in Networked Society, 193–197. 
53 Ashbourn, Practical Biometrics: From Aspiration to Implementation, 22. 
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in the capturing, processing, and screening of facial photographs.  Similarly, due to its 
non–invasive nature and quick ability to be discerned by human visual examination, 
facial photographs are proving to be one of the most universal biometric identifiers. 
b. Fingerprints 
The advent of fingerprinting could be credited as being perhaps the most 
significant contribution towards verifiable identity and is becoming the hallmark of 
biometric identification.  The human fingerprint has seen the longest and most consistent 
use as a highly reliable biometric identifier, and fingerprint technology has recently 
enjoyed some substantial improvements.  The ability to capture, process, analyze, and 
share this biometric identifier has developed to the point that some programs are using 
fingerprints as a standalone identifier.54  Considering these improvements in current 
technology, digital fingerprints are perhaps the best biometric identifier that can be 
effectively used for both establishing and authenticating an individual human identity.   
Fingerprints are truly unique to an individual and nearly independent from 
our genetic makeup, making them an ideal biometric identifier.55  Discerning differences 
between fingerprints is largely based on measuring the ridges and troughs found in the 
skin, commonly known as minutiae.56  The unique designs made by the minutiae are 
classified according to their physical characteristic, which allows individual prints to be 
cataloged and compared.  As the ability to collect, catalogue, and effectively analyze 
individual prints was perfected in the early 1900s, states and international organizations 
began collecting fingerprints and manually analyzing these remarkably unique and highly 
                                                 
54 The U.S. Secure Communities Initiative is program designed specifically to cross–check inmate 
fingerprints with national immigration records in an effort to validate citizenship.  Spencer S. Hsu, "U.S. to 
Expand Immigration Checks to all Local Jails," The Washington Post, sec. Politics, 19 May 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/18/AR2009051803172.html (accessed 04 
October 2010). 
55 Bolle and others, Guide to Biometrics, 31. 
56 Ibid., 35. 
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individualized identifiers.57  The ability to credibly identify individuals by the use of 
fingerprints proved immediately useful in the realm of criminology and has been used 
heavily in related fields as well as the public sector ever since. 
Perhaps the most notable development in fingerprint analysis, which is 
pertinent to immigration and border control, was the incorporation of computer 
processing that occurred in the 1960s.58  Since then, numerous manufacturers have 
continually developed and improved the technologies and equipment used in the 
collection, processing, and subsequent comparison of fingerprints.  The culmination of 
advances in automation and processing capability allowed for fingerprints to become the 
main identification source for state agencies such as the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI)59, as well as prominent international organizations such as the 
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL.)60  The systems and technology 
that are used to acquire, process, and search fingerprint databases is commonly known as 
automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS) and are continually incorporated into 
identification and screening systems today.  The ability to use AFIS and rapidly share 
information through computerized technology reinforces the role of fingerprints in 
verifiable identity through the creation of digitally searchable and instantly sharable 
information. 
In biometrics, the traditional methods of collecting ink fingerprints have 
largely given way to “livescan” techniques, which actively scan fingerprints through the 
use of an electronic device.  These captured systems are typically based upon one or a 
combination of the following methods and technologies: (1) reflection technologies, 
                                                 
57 Ronald K. Noble, "Opening Remarks: 5th INTERPOL International Symposium on Fingerprints" 
(Lyon, France, INTERPOL, 4 June 2008), 
http://www.interpol.int/public/ICPO/speeches/2008/SGFingerprints20080604.asp# (accessed 01 October 
2010). 
58 Keith A. Rhodes and U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security Challenges in using 
Biometrics (Washington, D.C: GAO-03-1137T, September 2003), 7, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031137t.pdf (accessed 17 February 2010). 
59 By the 1950s it is estimated that the FBI database contained over 110 million fingerprints and 
developed AFIS by 1960. Watner and McElroy, National Identification Systems: Essays in Opposition, 97. 
60 INTERPOL adopted a standardized AFIS in 1996.  Noble, Opening Remarks: 5th INTERPOL 
International Symposium on Fingerprints. 
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which use light to capture minutiae details; (2) capacitance methods, which rely on 
electrical charges to map individual minutiae; (3) thermal sensing, which creates a 
minutiae map using variance in temperatures; or (4) ultrasound, which uses a beam of 
sound to map or measure the differences between different minutiae.61  While these 
methods of capturing and analyzing fingerprints are continuously refined, the quality of 
the capture can often determine the usefulness of the print.  The physical and 
environmental conditions prevalent on an individual finger such as moisture, cleanliness, 
or finger pressure on the capture device can also cause significant differences between 
captures, although these issues are being rapidly corrected through improvements to 
collection systems.  Despite these issues, fingerprints are currently the most proliferated 
and recognized biometric identifiers that when paired with advanced computer 
technologies have the potential to provide widespread and reliable access to verifiable 
identification and authentication. 
c. Iris Scan 
Iris scanning is one of the more recent biometric identifiers that may be 
more promising than facial photos and fingerprints in achieving verifiable identity.  The 
main advantage of iris scans over other biometric identifiers is their notable increases in 
accuracy when used for authentication.62  Although iris scans are not as widely accepted 
by the public as facial photos and fingerprints, literature is beginning to reflect that as an 
individual human identifier “iris scanning appears to be the most robust and most 
accurate” biometric identifier currently available.63  Using the iris as a biometric 
identifier is a fairly simple process that involves capturing an image of the iris and 
subsequently computing the prominent features with algorithms designed for pattern 
recognition.64  The ability to process an iris scan is independent of eye color, and the eye 
                                                 
61 Bolle and others, Guide to Biometrics, 33. 
62 John G. Daugman, "High Confidence Visual Recognition of Persons by a Test of Statistical 
Independence," IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 15, no. 11 (1993), 1148. 
63 Garfinkel, Database Nation: The Death of Privacy in the 21st Century, 57. 
64 Li and others, Advances in Biometric Person Authentication: 5th Chinese Conference on Biometric 
Recognition, SINOBIOMETRICS 2004, Guangzhou, China, December 13–14, 2004, Proceedings, 539. 
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has some natural properties that protect against falsification of this specific biometric.65  
Border control and immigration programs today are largely focused on facial photos and 
fingerprints, but there are already existing provisions within many border control 
identification systems to accommodate the use of iris scans. 
Some of the strengths of the human iris as a biometric identifier are: (1) 
the physical characteristics of an iris are not genetically determined; (2) the iris pattern is 
developed before birth and does not vary substantially over time (as can facial photos and 
fingerprints); (3) the error probabilities associated with iris scans are much more 
favorable than those of facial photos or fingerprints; (4) iris scanning technology is less 
vulnerable to falsification or forgery; and (5) the processing time for comparing iris scans 
is exceptionally fast, which makes it ideal for use in screening applications.66  Despite 
these advantages, there is a fair amount of public stigma about the intrusiveness of 
capturing iris images.67  This perception is likely due to the fact that the acquisition 
process can be perceived as more intrusive than a simple electronic palm reader or a 
quick digital photograph.  Despite these difficulties, it seems that the superior 
performance of iris scanning in human identification will result in the further 
investigation and use of this highly desirable identifier for use in identification and 
authentication. 
2. Using Biometric Identifiers 
Biometric identification can be useful in the traditional roles of establishing 
identity and authenticating known identities, but their use in immigration can extend well 
beyond these traditional roles.  Through the use of computer technology, biometric 
identifiers are being increasingly used to quickly and accurately screen individuals 
                                                 
65 Jain, Bolle and Pankanti, Biometrics: Personal Identification in Networked Society, 118–119. 
66 Ibid., 104–120.  
67 When deciding on the biometric identifiers to be included in ICAO mandated Machine Readable 
Travel Documents (MRTDs), several biometric identifiers were compared for usability, compatibility, 
redundancy, perception, storage capability, and performance.  Based on the expected performance in these 
areas, facial photographs were chosen as the primary biometric identifier with fingerprints and iris scans 
being included as secondary identifiers.  Mary K. McMunn, "Machine Readable Travel Documents with 
Biometric Enhancement: The ICAO Standard," ICAO MRTD Report 1, no. 1 (2006), 25, 
http://www2.icao.int/en/MRTD/Pages/ICAOMRTDReport.aspx (accessed 24 May 2010). 
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against a known set of identities, identify previously unknown individuals, and assign 
verifiable identity to new individuals in a more reliable manner than traditional 
nomenclature based methods.  Understanding the practical methods by which biometrics 
are put into use is essential to develop an understanding of how specific biometric 
identifiers and systems should operate.   
Practitioners and decision makers also need to be somewhat familiar with the 
reliability issues associated with individual biometric identifiers and the systems involved 
in their capture and processing.  This section will further describe some of the specific 
templates of the biometric identifiers discussed above and explain some of the theory and 
systems used for various biometric matching and screening systems.  A brief introduction 
to error rates is also included to explain the dialogue often encountered when pursuing 
identity solutions using biometric identifiers.  Understanding how biometric identifiers 
are used, as well as the literary conventions used when discussing biometric performance, 
is crucial to understanding biometric systems and their utility in border control. 
a. Templates of Identifiers 
The ability to capture, store, process, and share biometric identifiers is 
highly dependent on the standardization and integration of computerized equipment.  
Facial photographs, fingerprints, and iris scans as they are currently used in biometric 
identification are all processed as a certain type of digital image.  These images can be 
further broken down and described as pixels or the smallest distinguishable unit within an 
image.  The color characteristics of the individual pixels within the image can then be 
translated into bytes capable of being analyzed, stored, or exchanged using computers. 
There are a number of different capture devices currently available to 
capture and record biometric identifiers, all with varying levels of detail or different 
technological capabilities.  For these devices to properly exchange information in a 
useable format for the processing systems, the information needs to be standardized.  The 
formats and standards for biometric information are regularly addressed by different 
standards agencies, both national and international in an effort to promote the usability of 
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identifiers and compatibility between systems.68  The ultimate goal is to provide the 
ability for select biometric identification equipment to be capable of capturing and 
relaying data in a format that can be commonly shared, accessed, and processed for use in 
solving the identity problem. 
Facial photographs are perhaps the easiest identifier to capture and record 
digitally, the recommended standardized format is essentially a digital picture formatted 
to either conventional RGB standards or the newer electronic JPEG formats.69  The 
photographs stored upon (or perhaps within) identification cards are typically intended to 
be used for identification and authentication largely by human inspectors conducting a 
visual inspection, however, many systems are beginning to offer the ability to conduct 
fully automated electronic comparisons as well.  The electronic comparisons are typically 
conducted between stored images contained in a database or within a token (e–Passport) 
and an actual live capture photograph, matching images would indicate identity 
authentication.  This is part of the intent of shifting to biometric enabled travel documents 
as highlighted by the ICAO standards.70  As such, photographs used for identification 
remain largely the same standard color passport photograph that most are used to seeing 
on international documents. 
Fingerprint data is somewhat more complex but still relies on an imaging 
device that can capture and characterize the minute details of the skin.  Whether 
fingerprints are taken via ink or “livescan”, the standardized format for fingerprint data is 
a digital capture processed as either a binary or a grayscale image.  Inked fingerprints are 
often scanned into an image while “livescan” prints are converted directly by the capture 
system.  Fingerprint images of individual fingers are relatively small in size and often 
several images are stored together to represent a full set of prints.  The difference 
                                                 
68 The current International Standard for biometric data is published as a joint venture between the 
ISO (International Organization for Standardization) and the IEC (International Electrotechnical 
Commission) and is a series of publications under the heading ISO/IEC 19794. 
69 R. Michael McCabe and Elaine M. Newton, eds., American National Standard for Information 
Systems - Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, and Other Biometric Information - Part 
1, (Gaithersburg, MD: American National Standards Institute, Inc., May 2007), 140, 
http://www.nist.gov/itl/ansi/upload/Approved-Std-20070427-2.pdf (accessed 2 October 2010). 
70 International Civil Aviation Organization, Machine Readable Travel Documents: Specifications for 
Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification Capability, II–11. 
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between binary and grayscale formats is that binary describes individual pixels as either 
black or white (1 or 0) while the grayscale format assigns a pixel one of 256 different 
shades of grey.71  The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) also prescribes a 
corresponding resolution of either high or low for each method, which equates to either 
250 or 500 pixels per inch.72  This essentially equates to four different image formats that 
can be exchanged between systems and subsequently processed with proprietary 
software.  Minutiae details for each print can are also processed in association with the 
fingerprint and similarly converted into a digital image format that can be shared 
electronically.  In addition to these conventional formats, there are also a few proprietary 
systems and formats for fingerprints that can be safely exchanged through electronic 
media using similar labeling methods but retaining high levels of confidentiality between 
users. 
Iris scans are also typically captured, recorded, and shared as digital 
images in a very similar fashion as facial photographs.  In many cases, the same 
equipment is used to process an iris scan as is used to capture a normal digital 
photograph.  Some of the newer iris scan devices are designed to incorporate security 
measures such as pupil measurements to check for liveness and glare assessments to 
check for contact lenses or glasses worn by an individual.  The actual processing of the 
iris image occurs in the same manner as in the facial photograph with either an RGB 
color scheme or using the grayscale method to standardize the data.  Both methods are 
acceptable as they accurately convey the distinct markings contained within the human 
iris with enough fidelity to allow processing and analysis.  The iris images tend to be 
somewhat smaller in size than either facial photographs or fingerprints when stored in the 
conventional manner and seem to have characteristics that allow for much faster indexing 
when used for comparisons.73 
                                                 
71 McCabe and Newton, American National Standard for Information Systems–Data Format for the 
Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, and Other Biometric Information - Part 1, 6. 
72 Ibid., 17. 
73 In theory, iris codes can be compared at up to “160 Million codes per second.”  Daugman, High 
Confidence Visual Recognition of Persons by a Test of Statistical Independence, 1159. 
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The following table summarizes the ANSI recommended standards for the 
sizes of select biometric identifiers by dots (or pixels) per inch and lists the allocated 
space that set aside within the e-Passport Machine Readable Travel Documents (e-
MRTDs) for storing biometric identifiers digitally within the document.74 
 
Table 2.   Size Conversion of Digital Biometric Identifiers 
These digitized biometric identifiers can also be securely converted 
through the use of cryptology, ensuring the privacy and protection of individual biometric 
information.75  The ability to package biometric identifiers in a digital form allows for the 
secure transmission prevalent between electronic communication equipment.  Most of 
these identifiers can be passed between agencies in under a second—even with their 
accompanying header information.  Part of the reason that biometric identification is 
becoming a viable solution in border control and other identity applications is the 
advances in computer technology that has allowed agencies to digitize biometric 
identifiers.  Translating human identification characteristics into a manageable image 
format allows an individual’s unique and distinguishable traits to be quickly captured, 
transported, stored, or retrieved. 
                                                 
74 International Civil Aviation Organization, Machine Readable Travel Documents: Specifications for 
Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification Capability, II–8. 
75 Sachar Paulus, Norbert Pohlmann and Helmut Reimer, eds., ISSE 2006–Securing Electronic 
Busines Processes (Wiesbaden, Germany: Vieweg (GWV), 2006), 197, 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/g075k556151058n1/fulltext.pdf (accessed 26 May 2010). 
Approximate Size Conversion of Digital Biometric Identifiers 
As Prescribed by ANSI-NIST–ITL 1–2007 
 
Identifier Typical Individual Image Size Average # of Pixels e-Passport 
Capacities 
Facial Photograph 1in x 1in (300dpi) 90,000 15-20 kB 
Fingerprint .7in x .5in (500dpi) 87,500 100 kB* 
Iris Scan .5in x .5in (512dpi) 65,536 60 kB* 
 
*Currently the e-Passport format allows 10kB per finger image and 30kB per iris image for storage (which 
add to 100kB and 60kB total storage capacity.) 
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b. Comparisons and Matching 
Identifiers may be used in a myriad of ways in solving the identity 
problem from verifying that a presented fingerprint is the same a another stored copy to 
attempting to determine the identity of an individual solely from an identifier.  These 
processes of comparing and matching biometrics each have unique attributes and 
individualized solutions when used for authentication and/or screening.  This section will 
describe some of the common authentication and screening operations that are performed 
my matching or comparing biometric identifiers with respect to immigration and border 
control.  Using biometrics to solve identity problems often depends upon the extent of 
comparison that needs to be accomplished in order to determine whether or not a match 
exists.  Matching known individuals to their biometric identifiers is relatively simple, 
while screening to detect matches from a large database can be quite complex. 
One method of matching is the comparison of known entities using 
biometric identifiers.  Authenticating a known individual against a known biometric 
template is perhaps the most basic task that can be performed, often with amazing 
precision and speed.  Matching an individual to their preestablished biometric template is 
fairly simple and often called a one–to–one match.  The process can be accomplished in a 
myriad of ways, but typically requires an existing recorded biometric stored on a token or 
within a database and a “livescan” biometric from which to compare features.76  In this 
case, the biometric system only has to determine if the “livescan” sample matches the 
existing template.  This type of match is often quick since the only computation is the 
comparison algorithm between the biometrics.  In immigration and border control one–
to–one matching is used in biometric systems to confirm whether or not a supplied facial 
photograph or fingerprint matches the recorded template stored on a biometrically 
enabled passport or within a system database. 
Another matching problem that can be solved using biometric identifiers is 
to attempt to match a known sample to another identifier in larger sample.  This type of 
match is commonly referred to as a one–to–many type of match.  This type of match can 
                                                 
76 Bolle and others, Guide to Biometrics, 24. 
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be used for identification or authentication depending on the specific application.  In 
immigration or border control applications this type of operation is commonly used in 
screening functions.77  Immigration applicants provide biometric identifiers that are then 
compared with a database in order to determine if they are a match to any of the known 
individuals contained within the sample, such as a terrorist watchlist.  Processing this 
type of matching function can take more time and typically depends on the number of 
samples that require comparison, or the size of the database.  The individual 
characteristics of fingerprints and iris scans lend naturally to classifications that allow 
them to be catalogued by similarity.  This increases the speed of matching operations by 
only allowing computations on samples that are a likely match.  As of 1998, it was 
reported that “only fingerprint and eye technologies are proven to have acceptable 
recognition rates to be practical for one–to–many matching.”78  Since then, there have 
been several technological developments in facial recognition, which are beginning to 
yield similar recognition rates.79 
c. Recognition and Error Rates 
Measuring the accuracies of biometric systems when it comes to matching 
individual identifiers is often discussed in terms of recognition rates.  The methods and 
convention for labeling these recognition rates can differ slightly depending on the 
system design or potentially the commercial manufacturer.  Regardless of the 
nomenclature used, these rates are based the probability of a biometric system being able 
to match a pair of identifiers that are a true match or reject a pair of identifiers that do not 
match.  The possible errors that can occur based on this expected outcome are: (1) 
matching a pair of identifiers that are not a true match; or (2) not matching a pair of 
identifiers that are a true match.  For this discussion these errors will be labeled as False 
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79 See “3D Face Recognition Using Stereoscopic Vision” and “A Face Recognition System Based on 
Local Feature Characterization” in Massimo Tistarelli, Josef Bigün and Enrico Grosso, eds., Advanced 
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Accept or False Reject for identification and False Negative or False Positive for 
screening, which is in line with some of the more current discussions on biometric error 
rates.80  In immigration and border control, the occurrence of these errors can range from 
a slight inconvenience to a state unknowingly allowing a terrorist to enter its borders. 
Depending on the purpose of the biometric identification system, 
authentication can be of a positive or negative nature and errors can cause substantially 
different implications.  Positive authentication is when a person provides a fingerprint 
that is a match to the fingerprint stored on file or within a passport, essentially verifying 
an individual.  Negative authentication is when a person provides a fingerprint and it is 
cross-checked against a watchlist database and found not to match any of the known 
terrorist templates, otherwise known as screening.  Many would tend to agree that in this 
scenario, errors in the negative authentication portion could be potentially more 
devastating.  The following table illustrates some of these different errors, how they are 
commonly termed, and how they could potentially manifest in an immigration or border 
control situation. 
 
Table 3.   Types of Errors in Immigration and Border Control 
Understanding the types of errors that are possible in a matching scenario 
is essential in assessing individual biometric matching technology and biometric 
matching systems as a whole.  Many of the current systems marketed are advertised 
along with their expected or proven error rates.  Properly assessing the accuracy of a 
specific biometric matching system must involve the measure of both error rates, as well 
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Types of Biometric Identification Errors in Immigration and Border Control 
 
Type of Error Authentication Type Identity Problem Result 
False Accept Positive Verification Grants Entry to Unauthorized Person 
False Reject Positive Verification Denies Entry to Authorized Person 
False Negative Negative Screening Fails to Flag Known Terrorist 
False Positive Negative Screening Flags Person Who is Not a Known Terrorist 
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as some knowledge as to how they were obtained.81  Taking these issues into account, the 
following table is a generalized approximation of the current error rates of biometric 
matching systems that a user can reasonably expect to obtain (realizing that this largely 
depends on the type of biometric equipment and the intended use.)82 
 
Table 4.   Error Rates of Biometric Matching Systems 
In this representation of error rates, it is clear that the False Accept rates 
are much lower than the False Reject rates for every identifier.  This may lead to very 
accurate identification verification systems, but in screening applications a much higher 
False Reject rate would be desired.  Based on the implications of these error rates in 
different matching situations (verification vs. screening), the debate between desired 
False Accept and False Reject tends to be largely based around the required levels of 
security that a system needs to provide.  Watchlist operations demand a much lower False 
Reject rate to ensure that potential matches are flagged.  Knowing the expected error 
rates of the matching system and understanding the desired implementation can lead 
users to make appropriate decisions about which biometric identifier and system to select 
to best suit the purpose, be it verification or screening. 
Depending on the equipment and purpose of the biometric identification 
task, some systems or matching software can be adjusted to provide more or less accurate 
                                                 
81For more techniques on assessing performance and error rates see: James L. Wayman, "Error Rate 
Equations for the General Biometric System," Robotics & Automation Magazine, IEEE 6, no. 1 (1999), 35–
48. 
82 Li and others, Advances in Biometric Person Authentication: 5th Chinese Conference on Biometric 
Recognition, SINOBIOMETRICS 2004, Guangzhou, China, December 13–14, 2004, Proceedings, 44. 
Commonly Published Error Rates of Biometric Matching Systems 
 
Identifier False Reject False Accept 
Facial Photo 10-20 % .001-.01 % 
Fingerprint 3-7 % .001-.01 % 
Iris Scan 2-10 % ≥0.001 % 
 
Adapted from an article by Bolle, Ratha and Pankanti titled “Performance Evaluation in 1:1 
Biometric Engines,” and published in Advances in Biometric Person Authentication, 
Springer, 2004. 
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rates, which are generally a trade–off between convenience and security.  Combining the 
known identification task with the desired accuracy allows operators to specify the 
acceptable errors for the biometric system.  These considerations can often be dictated by 
setting desired thresholds for matching or purposefully designing very specific system 
equipment.  Verifying an individual’s identity or positive authentication should have a 
very low tolerance for errors, so that the focus is maintained on only allowing entry to 
authorized persons.  Screening on the other hand may want systems to have somewhat 
higher tolerance for errors in matching, so that any identifier that may be a close or 
possible match would be identified by the system.  Biometric systems are often designed 
or programmed based on a specific set of constraints intended to suit the identification 
purpose and most systems can be constructed or adjusted to reflect the desired matching 
tolerances.  Understanding these fundamental performance indicators and the specific 
intent of the biometric identification system is crucial when putting biometric identifiers 
into practical application to enhance state security.  
3. Biometric System Components and Structure 
Moving beyond a basic understanding of biometric identifiers and their individual 
characteristics, users need to also understand the process and structure of biometric 
identification systems.  The ability to leverage biometrics in a comprehensive 
identification or screening program will depend on users and managers understanding, 
managing, and protecting individual identification systems.  Biometric identification or 
authentication systems may have unique attributes, but all share mandatory components 
that merit discussion.  Using biometrics for identification and screening is highly reliant 
on the interoperability between humans and technology and can be subject to 
vulnerabilities if not used properly.  This section will describe the required processes 
associated with biometric identification programs building upon the discussion of using 
biometric identifiers to solve the identity problem.  Understanding the components and 
processes of biometric systems will allow follow on discussion of the specific procedures 
associated with some of the immigration and border control applications. 
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One of the more important issues in biometric systems is the creation and 
maintenance of a biometric database.  Databases are used in both identification and 
authentication by working in conjunction with biometric matching engines.  Accurate and 
useable databases are critical to the process of screening individuals.  The ability to 
capture identifiers, manage the digitized identifiers, and perhaps even share information 
with others are all very specific functions that can determine the effectiveness of a 
biometric identification program.  Databases will be introduced in this section so as to 
provide a common understanding of their use in identification applications and present 
some of the challenges that users and managers may confront when using biometric 
identification and authentication as a security implement. 
Despite the advances and refinements that biometric identification may provide in 
solving the identity solution, there are still the persistent vulnerabilities that plague every 
identification system.  With a thorough knowledge of these vulnerabilities, designers and 
users can make efforts to eliminate or mitigate their effects.  This section will conclude 
with some of the types of identification fraud that biometric systems will need to confront 
in order to maintain their promised gains towards verifiable identification. 
a. Typical Program Components 
The ability to construct accurate and reliable biometric identification 
systems capable of increasing the reliability with which agencies solve the identity 
problem requires a properly constructed system.  The processes that occur within a 
biometric identification program largely describe the system setup and drive the 
requirements for equipment and resources.  Despite the role, identification or screening, 
each system follows a general process of acquiring identifiers, storing identifiers, and 
matching identifiers.  The way different systems go about these functions may vary 
substantially but each function is a required part of the overall method of biometric 
identification.  This section will briefly describe these steps and illuminate some methods 
that are currently used in immigration and border control. 
Acquiring biometric identifiers is essential to performing all subsequent 
steps within a biometric identification system.  This process is often termed enrollment 
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and constitutes the collection of biometric identifiers and their immediate association 
with a certain individual.83  This process can vary substantially from voluntary to 
required and overt to covert, but is essential to begin to implement biometric 
identification.  Enrolling an identifier into any biometric program essentially creates the 
identity in the program and provides a reference point from which to compare future 
matches.  The quality criteria of enrollment identifiers tend to be fairly high and current 
systems can often indicate whether an identifier meets the minimum criteria for the 
specific program.  In immigration and border control, this step is often when an 
individual first applies for a passport and provides a facial photograph and set of 
fingerprints.  The capture and storage of these identifiers and their association with a 
certain identity is essentially the benchmark of an identity within the biometric 
identification program. 
To use the identifiers that are collected through enrollment or presented 
for verification, biometric identification systems perform what is commonly referred to as 
feature extraction.84  This process involves the analysis of the digitized identifier in a 
format and manner that allows for classification and subsequent use for either 
identification or authentication.  Feature extraction can be quite complicated and is often 
highly dependent upon the proprietary nature of the biometric identification system.  This 
process can be best described as the translation of a digitized identifier into some discrete 
value or set of values, which can then be numerically compared with other values.  In 
contrast to the storage standardizations presented earlier for the digital images of 
identifiers, feature extraction instead refers to the specific pattern recognition 
methodology, selected algorithms, and template systems that are characteristic of 
individual biometric identification systems.  Often entire identification systems are 
designed around different feature extraction capabilities.  Despite the identification goal 
or specific identifiers used, each biometric identification system must perform some form 
of feature extraction.  The ability to perform this function directly enables and is often 
tied to the matching function that often provides the end result. 
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The ability to positively identify individuals through biometric 
identification relies on the ability to match individual biometric identifiers.  This portion 
of a biometric system is termed the feature or biometric matcher or simply the matching 
engine.85  The matching engine uses the extracted features of submitted biometrics and 
compares them against each other mathematically to determine whether or not they can 
be considered to be the same sample.  Based on the matching function that is desired and 
the acceptable level of accuracy; the identifiers are compared as appropriate.  The 
matching engine is often proprietary, usually contained within the system software, and 
can be tied to the feature extraction methodology.  These matching engines are based on 
statistical pattern recognition methods and often programmed to the specific applications 
(customized towards either security or convenience.) 
For one–to-one matching engines, one identifier is set as the baseline or 
reference identifier (typically the one obtained in enrollment) and is then used as the basis 
for which to compare the submitted identifier.  In a one–to–many matching engine, the 
submitted identifier (typically obtained via livescan) is set to the baseline and then the 
entire dataset is compared to the livescan capture in an effort to discern if there is a stored 
identifier that could be considered a match.  These matching tasks can be substantially 
different in the way they are processed and vary with respect to the biometric system, the 
selected identifiers, and the acceptable or desired error rates.  Pattern recognition is the 
field of study that deals with the nuances of the biometric matching engines.  This field of 
research is currently experiencing unprecedented growth with respect to biometric 
identification.  Efforts continue to be made that enhance the ability for machines to 
compare biometric identifiers and pattern recognition studies continue to improve the 
accuracy and usefulness of biometric identification systems. 
Understanding the components of a biometric identification system allows 
for appropriate decisions to be made in regards to the suitability of effectiveness of an 
individual system.  Each biometric identification system will necessarily have component 
parts that process enrollment, feature extraction, and some sort of matching engine.  
                                                 
85 Jain, Bolle and Pankanti, Biometrics: Personal Identification in Networked Society, 22. 
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Biometric identification systems can contain multiple components that perform these 
functions or be combined with other separate systems depending on the desired design 
and required capabilities.  The basic design and implementation of these systems and 
eventually how they are put into practical application will depend largely on the 
capabilities of the system components.  Combining these functions into a coherent system 
or assessing an “off the shelf” system will require the investigation to the enrollment, 
feature extraction, and matching engine functions with respect to accuracy, speed, and 
cost.  Understanding the design and function of the basic biometric identification systems 
should provide the background and context required to understand many of the programs 
being put into practice in the security realm. 
b. Biometric Database 
An essential part of any biometric program that may not necessarily be a 
part of the system itself is the construction, maintenance, or merely access of an 
accompanying database capable of providing biometric identifier information.  Databases 
used in biometric identification can be physically integrated or disjoined from the rest of 
the biometric identification system.  Databases can be customized for the feature 
extraction or matching engines or merely masses of standardized digital identifier 
templates.  The ability to create, manage, and successfully extract biometric data from a 
database is an integral function and a topic much debated amongst researchers and 
practitioners alike. 
The requirement for an accompanying database in biometric identification 
is largely predicated upon what portion of the identity solution is being solved.  
Applications for basic biometric identity confirmation may be as simple as placing a 
collected identifier upon a token (ID card) and verifying the user via livescan techniques 
against the identifier upon the token.  In this instance, the “database” is the single 
identifier stored on the token, in many circumstances a very usable form of identification.  
Extending beyond this to a screening function such as using terrorist watchlists, could 
drive a much different requirement—potentially one calling for a precise, secure, and 
most likely confidential database.  Often in practical applications, multiple databases are 
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accessed for varying portions of the identity solution.86  Determining the type of database 
that will be used in biometric identification is an important consideration in system 
design and implementation. 
c. Biometric Vulnerabilities 
Biometrics can substantially enhance traditional efforts at discerning 
verifiable identity, but are still vulnerable to attacks on either the user or the system.  
Traditional identification routines relied upon an individual having or knowing something 
like a token or password.  Biometrics eliminates the necessity for individuals to keep 
track of a physical item or retain the exclusive knowledge of a password by incorporating 
their individual physical characteristics into the identity solution.  Biometric identifiers 
are not subject to being lost or forgotten, but are still subject to forgery attempts or other 
methods of fraud.  The most prominent methods of fraud in biometric identification 
systems are coercive or impersonation attacks.87  Many manufacturers of biometric 
capture devices are countering these impersonation attacks by incorporating software that 
is capable of determining that an individual identifier is from a live subject and not a 
facsimile or fake biometric identifier.  Databases and digital data must also be protected 
as they are a large portion of biometric identification systems.  The electronic data 
contained within or associated with biometric identification systems or databases also 
needs to be protected with respect to availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, 
and nonrepudiation.88  Mitigating the known vulnerabilities of biometric identification 
systems and moving to positively protect the associated information will ensure that 
incorporating biometric identifiers into identity problem solutions do not allow 
unnecessary avenues of attack. 
                                                 
86 Using multiple identifiers to contribute to a solution is known as “multimodal” biometrics. An 
example of fingerprints combined with facial photos is contained in: Lin and Anil, Integrating Faces and 
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(accessed 01 October 2010). 
 42
Biometric systems that are properly constructed and effectively managed 
have the potential to advance efforts at discerning identity and performing authentication, 
specifically in regards to immigration and border control.  As with any other system, 
biometric identification is still subject to vulnerabilities that must be addressed and 
mitigated as these systems are put into practice.  Using a comprehensive analysis of the 
system components, managers and users can work to identify and mitigate many of these 
vulnerabilities. 
Although biometric identification provides avenues to reliably solve the 
identity problem, it is not immune to attacks or potential problems.  Databases and 
information must be protected and system developers must focus on providing reliable 
solutions that further reliable identification and authentication.  The topics discussed 
within this chapter should lay the foundation for exploring the merits of specific 
biometric identification technologies, as well as performing a full system analysis of 
highly individualized biometric identification systems.  Progressing from this point, this 
work will continue into some specific applications of biometric identification systems as 
they pertain to immigration and border control tasks and subsequently assess the potential 
for biometric identification to reduce terrorist incidents within a state’s borders. 
This chapter has introduced the problem of verifiable identity and 
explained how the use of biometric identifiers are being put into practical applications 
that have the potential of more accurately discerning identity and authenticating or 
screening individuals.  It detailed the problems associated with attempting to discern 
individual human identities and subsequently explained how biometric identifiers can be 
utilized through comprehensive identification systems to further this aim.  Properties of 
facial photographs, fingerprints, and iris scans were discussed in detail to portray their 
unique characteristics and outline their applicability for use in identification programs.  
Building upon the individual biometric identifiers, this chapter highlighted common 
terms and measures of performance for biometric identification systems.  Individual 
processes within broader biometric identification systems were identified and explained 
to provide a comprehensive understanding of the requirements and tasks these advanced 
identification technologies are expected to perform. 
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III. BIOMETRIC BORDER CONTROLS 
Developing world trends are driving unprecedented levels of international 
mobility, particularly personal interaction and travel across state borders.  While the 
increased interaction and traffic between states can yield rewards in terms of economic 
gains, increased transparency, strengthened relationships, and even personal freedom—it 
can also introduce vulnerabilities to potential malevolence.  Along these lines, many 
states are turning to more complicated and capable identification systems as well as 
streamlining their information sharing processes in an effort to facilitate the safe and 
effective flow of international human traffic.  Biometrics can help strengthen this process 
by providing accurate and reliable human identification and authentication.  
Incorporating the use of biometric identifiers into state identification initiatives enhances 
the ability to positively identify and screen individuals by unique and verifiable 
attributes.  Similarly, the ability to digitally catalogue and compare biometric identifiers 
largely supplants the reliance upon nomenclature systems for identifying and screening 
individuals.  Improving the discernment and accessibility of verifiable identity enables 
states to fully participate in the broadening mobility movement knowing that security 
threats can be better identified and potentially prevented from entering their borders. 
As states experience the increasing mobility through their borders and experiment 
with biometric identification systems, many are discovering the advantages of verifiable 
identity in securing their populace and state.  Throughout the entire immigration process, 
the ability to conclusively identify individuals through the use of biometrics can 
drastically increase the accuracy and reliability of the screening process prior to admitting 
intending immigrants.  Obtaining a validated identity prior to entry becomes the norm, 
while reliance on a human visual inspection or a computerized nomenclature analysis is 
becoming a purely secondary method.  Through swift and efficient information sharing, 
cooperative states can now benefit with respect to the screening and identification 
process.  The use of physical disguise or reliance upon an alias will no longer be a viable 
method to remain anonymous when attempting to penetrate a border. 
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This chapter will introduce some of the changes that are taking place in 
immigration flows as states become increasingly globalized to illuminate the magnitude 
of the identity problem when considering the number of people that are actively crossing 
state borders on a daily basis.  Approaching the problem of international migrations and 
border control, it will focus separately on identification and screening by examining 
systems designed to address each separate identity problem.  Concerning verifiable 
identification, it will explain in detail the current international effort to move towards 
biometrically enabled travel documents through the e–Passport program.  It will then turn 
to state specific screening functions by exploring the screening improvements made by 
the U.S. with respect to the immigration and border control processes.  It will conclude 
by attempting to discern the perceived U.S. security gains from the perspective of 
biometric integration by assessing recent visa refusal rates.  Overall this chapter seeks to 
illuminate some of the specific biometric identification programs available to states and 
illustrate their use through some select examples before moving to a larger integrated 
analysis of biometric borders in countering terrorism. 
A.  THE PROCESS OF CROSSING BORDERS 
Recent terrorist attacks, such as 9/11 and the Madrid bombings have spurned 
many states to place greater emphasis on preventing terrorist attacks within their borders, 
with an increasing focus upon perpetrators that emanate from abroad.  As a result, many 
states seem to be incorporating biometric identification and screening technologies into 
their immigration and border control programs.  The development of biometric solutions 
aimed at solving the identity problem (identification and authentication) are being 
incorporated throughout the immigration process and beginning to play a larger role in 
the screening of immigrants that has been traditionally based solely on nomenclature.  
Within the U.S. the entire immigration process has traditionally been highly 
compartmentalized with different agencies controlling different parts.  Since 9/11, this 
process has undergone substantial revisions and concerted efforts have been made to fully 
incorporate all available assets and agencies to better secure U.S. borders.  The use of 
biometric identification has strengthened the entire process with respect to verifiable 
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identity, as well as provided unprecedented opportunities to accurately and fairly screen 
individuals that would have otherwise gone through our borders undetected. 
In immigration and border control, the widely accepted solution to the identity 
problem was the creation of a passport.   Traditionally, passports include an identification 
piece in the form of an individual’s name, along with some additional personal 
information unique to the individual.  Identification and authentication are accomplished 
using the information and comparing the photo to the individual person.  This 
administrative process for crossing state borders remains largely intact today, yet can 
now benefit from the inclusion of biometric identifiers.  This process to enter or cross a 
border is mainly a three step process.  First, the traveler must acquire a suitable 
identification token, typically a passport.  Second, the traveler must apply and receive 
permission to enter or cross the border, which is otherwise known as receiving a visa.  
Finally, the individual must perform the actual border crossing where both the passport 
and visa are verified.  The goal of this section is to describe the magnitude of border 
transits using examples from of U.S. immigration statistics, explain some of the details of 
the process of crossing a border, and highlight some of the U.S. changes in border control 
that have come about as a result of the incorporation of biometric identifiers.  
1. Immigration Background 
State borders have been a symbol of sovereignty and often an insular barrier 
thought to serve as a buffer against unwanted outside influence.  It seems, however, that 
increasing globalization has leveled many of these once formidable defensive barriers 
and encourages the fluidity of ideas, people, commerce, and sometimes outside national 
influence across state borders.  This overwhelming trend has the ability to positively 
affect our personal lives, our interests, and our economies but requires greater exposure 
to unknown identities.  As individuals move through and within state borders, validated 
identity will become increasingly important in determining which individuals will be 
granted access rights.  The ability to present a verified identity along with the ability to 
convey personal trust of an individual can further the ability of states to provide for 
common defense without being subject to undue risk.  Although newfound mobility is 
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providing unprecedented interaction among peoples and nations along with increases in 
prosperity, it similarly presents challenges with respect to security and calls for better 
methods for the verification and screening of individuals desiring to transit state borders. 
Personal mobility and interaction throughout the international community seems 
to be on a continually increasing path.89  Societal globalization is facilitated by more 
efficient transportation, interconnected markets, political convenience and personal 
preferences.  Individuals today may have the most freedom to participate globally than at 
any point in history and many indicate that this global interconnectedness will continue 
on an increasing trend.  Obviously, with increasing interdependence and economic 
interactions comes the requisite transit and mobility of the associated populace.  This 
ability to move and interact globally is greatly facilitated by efficient transit through 
several physical borders, the most prominent being that of sovereign states.  Increasing 
incidences of border transitions will necessitate more efficient systems for establishing 
and validating identity in order to convey trust and facilitate travel.   
For the U.S., the creation and growth of our country has relied on permissive 
immigration policies.  These intending immigrants and visitors, however, present security 
challenges felt most at our borders.  The U.S. immigration and visa statistics are one 
testament to the increasing global mobility that nations now experience.  In 2008, the 
U.S. issued non-immigrant visas to just over 6.6 million people, while immigrant visas 
were issued to slightly less than 500,000 people.90  While the nearly 7 million people 
who are annually granted the privilege of entering the U.S. on some sort of official visa 
program alludes to the immigration numbers, it surprisingly underscores the magnitude of 
the problem of providing accurate and efficient border controls.  The U.S. Department of 
Commerce records of visitation and tourism to the U.S. gives a better idea of the 
magnitude of traffic imposed upon the U.S. border and our points of entry (POEs).  
                                                 
89 U.S. Joint Forces Command, The JOE, Joint Operating Environment, 2008 Challenges and 
Implications for the Future Joint Force (Suffolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, Center for 
Joint Futures, 2008), http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf (accessed 02 
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90 U.S. Dept of State, "Worldwide Non–Immigrant Visa Issuances Fiscal Years 2003–2008," U.S. 
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Information from 2008 shows that roughly 58 million visitors filed paperwork upon 
arrival at a U.S. port of entry.91  Adding the transits of U.S. citizens and accounting for 
the multiple entries allowed some visitors results in over 500 Million travelers that 
process through our “primary” border inspections every year, 92 of which nearly 279 
Million are foreign nationals.93 
The intrepid flux of individuals through our nation’s border creates vulnerabilities 
easily exploited by those intending to inflict harm on our nation and its people.  
Especially in light of staggering immigration statistics and the quest to preserve a sense 
of national security, the issue of providing adequate screening at our borders remains 
paramount and continues to be the center of many debates.  Although few contest the fact 
that states have the sovereign “right to obtain all the information it deems necessary from 
people who seek to enter its territory,” many contest the methods by which a nation goes 
about collecting the information in question.94  Quite often there are fears of 
inappropriate use of the information obtained, or the potential for unjust profiling of 
certain groups of individuals.95  The state must ensure fair yet adequate screening takes 
place so as not to place its citizens at risk, while maintaining a fairly open border policy 
for the benefit of the state. 
The addition of biometric identifiers can serve a twofold purpose in this securing 
state borders; verifiable identity can be used as a means of inclusion allowing citizens to 
enjoy deserved social benefits, while also securing against outside threats through the 
process of screening.  This ability to further the accuracy of verifiable identity in border 
control programs makes biometric identifiers a credible tool in mitigating a nation’s risk 
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to known criminals and terrorists.  The advent of established borders, which began as 
walls and evolved to the complex biometric systems we have today, still serves the same 
purpose, guarding the social benefits of a certain populace while providing for collective 
defense.  The challenge as state borders become increasingly transited will be adequately 
securing a populace against those that intend to access borders for the sole purpose of 
bringing destruction and harm. 
2. Immigration Process 
States use various methods to screen citizens and intending immigrants, which 
includes both visitors and permanent immigrants.  Immigrant screening in the U.S. has 
experienced some substantial changes mainly due to concern over immigration overstays 
and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  The events drove several U.S. agencies to acquire systems 
capable of providing better fidelity for immigration and border control.  Many of these 
systems sought to improve the ability to track U.S. immigrant entrance/exit data, perform 
reliable identification and screening, and better integrate data with both internal and 
external agencies.  This section will outline the general process of the U.S. immigration 
screening procedures in order to provide a general backdrop to better understand where 
biometric systems may prove applicable in immigration and border control programs.  
The U.S. procedures are perhaps a bit more evolved than many other states, but in general 
are reflective of the basic process.  Despite the state specific system, this section is 
designed to highlight the utility of biometric identifiers in the different stages of 
identification, authentication, and screening as it relates to immigration and border 
control. 
a. Passport—Visa—Border 
Immigrants intending to enter the U.S. are subject to a three-step process 
that involves a series of identification and authentication measures, which eventually 
yields authorization to enter the U.S. border.  The process is largely standardized amongst 
states and follows the following sequence: (1) the individual obtains a passport within the 
host nation; (2) the individual then applies for a visa to visit or immigrate to the 
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destination state; and (3) the individual travels to the state and submits the passport and 
visa at the border to gain entry.  Individuals are identified, authenticated and screened at 
various portions of the process and in slightly different manners.  The passport is 
ultimately the identification token that can be authenticated by U.S. officials, and the visa 
is the states permission to enter the U.S. border.96 
This largely three part system allows states to first evaluate the overall 
acceptability of the intending immigrant then allows individual states (the U.S. in this 
case) to determine the eligibility for a visa.  If a visa is granted and travel ensues, the 
individual’s identity can again be validated and authenticated prior to gaining entry into 
the state in question.  This process is similar for most nations and largely provides three 
opportunities to identify a potentially undesirable immigrant, which typically occur at the 
varying steps of the immigration process.  These separate steps in the immigration 
process present somewhat different challenges concerning identity and authentication, 
and can build upon each other depending on the system.  All three steps must be 
completed in succession before individuals are granting authorization to enter a state.  
The process also tends to incorporate different agencies and organizations at each step, 
although the collective work is aimed at ensuring the acceptability of an intending 
immigrant. 
b. Improving Identification–Authentication–Tracking 
The immigration process is not overly complex, yet it can suffer from 
intentional nefarious activity or simply inadequate methods to identify or authenticate 
individuals.  Throughout the process states have actively sought to improve their ability 
to verify and screen individual immigrants in an effort to increase security.  Identity 
authentication and screening often occur at all three points of the immigration process 
ensuring that an individual is not identified as a threat at any point.  Biometric screening 
programs enhance all three portions of the process by ensuring that both created and 
                                                 
96 There are some programs that waive the requirements for a visa such as the Visa Waiver Program 
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authenticated identities are legitimate, that identities are adequately vetted through 
digitized screening programs, and potentially illuminating attempts of malevolent actors 
to circumvent or advantage the system.  The digital format of these identifiers also 
enables quick and efficient use of electronic databases throughout the screening process 
and even at the actual border crossing. 
The tangible benefit of biometric integration into the immigration process 
is the discovery of individuals that have been able to falsify identification records in 
previous systems.  Counterfeiting, forgery, and imposters are the three main types of 
passport fraud, with the preponderance of abuses being reported as imposter fraud.  The 
U.S. experienced over 13,000 incidents of U.S. passport or border crossing card fraud in 
2009 alone.97  Before the incorporation of biometrics most of the physical passport fraud 
in the U.S. was committed by an individual using their photograph with another 
individual’s information—a process that is largely preventable through biometric 
authentication.98  Biometric identification systems also reduce the chances that nefarious 
individuals known to governments can effectively use a passport that was created with 
their actual information as they will most likely be detected through the screening 
process.99  The ability to store and share identifiers also allows multiple authentications 
at a single step.  This allows states to compare the individual’s identity to the recorded 
biometric within the travel document as well as with a biometric stored within a remote 
database.  Advances in electronic protection of the individual documents also reduce the 
chance that an individual travel document can be intentionally manipulated after 
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biometric data is assigned.100  The result is a much more highly integrated immigration 
system from passport application to the actual border crossing.  Increased continuity 
between agencies and information sharing between states can enhance the security of the 
immigration process. 
B. BIOMETRICS IN IMMIGRATION 
The merits of biometric identification are becoming more evident to many states, 
as evidenced by the rate at which biometric identification systems are being incorporated 
into state immigration and border control programs.  As of 2008, there were over 61 
states that are openly using biometric screening programs.101  The overwhelming 
majority of these states were relying upon the ICAO e–Passport biometrically enabled 
travel documents.102  The range of identification systems at use within these states spans 
the spectrum and the inclusion of various proprietary and shared databases is becoming 
the norm.  States are also beginning to realize the benefits from requiring biometric 
identifiers in travel documents.103  Many of these successes are only government and 
news reports of increased denials, deportations, or identified duplicate applicants, but 
there certainly seems to be some perceived benefit based on the numbers of states that are 
actively pursuing programs. 
This section will discuss some of the specifics of the ICAO e–Passport program 
as well as the U.S. specific US–VISIT program to illustrate their structures and how they 
incorporate biometric identification to further increase security in the immigration and 
border control arena.  Focusing on verifiable identification, the e–Passport program is an 
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international effort to standardize and promulgate the incorporation of biometrics into 
travel documents in order to assist states in verifying identity.  The US–VISIT program 
builds upon the biometrically enabled documents and represents some of the more robust 
screening programs that are in use to protect states from nefarious immigrants.  Defining 
the aspects of these programs will allow for a follow–on analysis of biometric 
identification in relation to terrorist incidents and a comparison of the U.S. immigration 
rates of refusal for the areas of terrorism and security. 
1. e-Passport Program—Solving Identification 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has taken the lead on 
addressing the need for verifiable identity within the international community with the 
advent of the e–Passport program.104  The term e–Passport is short for electronic passport 
and is indicative of the overall program aim.  The program is largely a set of standards for 
implementing biometrics into travel documents in order to more accurately and reliable 
solve the problem of identification.  The e–Passport program encourages states to 
upgrade their traditional passports for a newer biometrically enabled document and has 
created an international standard for machine readable travel documents (e–MRTDs) 
ensuring that these documents could be utilized internationally with common equipment.  
The new passports contain a computerized chip that is able to store biometric identifiers 
in a common template for use with different state identification programs.  The identifiers 
currently used in conjunction with e–Passport are a mandatory facial photo and the 
optional inclusion of fingerprints and iris scans. 
a.  Program Description  
The e–Passport program is the culmination of work that began in 1968 in 
an effort to better secure passports through the use of computers and speed passengers 
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through the immigration process.105  In 1998, the concept and study of biometrics was 
introduced as a form of verifiable identity that could be incorporated into the electronic 
document.106  The intent of having a machine readable document with a tamperproof 
identifier was to cut down on the fraudulent documents and create a readily verifiable tie 
between the document and the user.107  ICAO subsequently decided on a format for the 
document, developed accompanying security protocols, and selected the facial 
photograph to be the incorporated biometric identifier.  The program was finally 
introduced in 2004 as an international standard for travel documents and is seeing 
increased implementation by several states as a portion of their immigration and border 
control programs.  The e–Passport document is designed to contain a microprocessor 
within the document combined with a “contactless mechanism for data transmission.”108  
This allows the document to be read simply by being in close proximity to the reader.  If 
used properly, the document provides substantially more information than the previous 
non-electronic passports.  States must decide on protocols and systems to compliment the 
e–Passport program in determining verifiable identity. 
b. Identifiers Used 
Incorporating biometric identifiers into travel documents is a largely 
debated topic with several arguing about the potential privacy issues of digitizing 
personal information becoming a “slippery slope.”109  Several considerations were taken 
into account in deciding upon the specific identifiers that would be endorsed for use in a 
standardized document.  The designers weighed the performance of individual identifiers, 
cost of equipment required to incorporate identifiers, public acceptance and privacy 
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concerns, as well as the potential usefulness in state specific applications.  After some 
dispute, the only biometric identifier that will be required to be incorporated into the e–
Passport document is a facial photograph, but the documents were also designed with 
available storage space specifically set aside for fingerprint and iris scan images.  The 
provisions in the document for fingerprints and iris scans are considered optional and left 
to each state for deciding whether or not to incorporate.  The format of the facial 
photograph contained within the e–MRTD is a portrait size color photograph.110  The use 
of the facial photograph was considered to be adequate for enhancing verifiable 
identification, while still remaining within many of the readily accepted standards for 
privacy concerning the collection of biometric identifiers.   
c. Identity Solutions 
Solutions to immigration and border control often rely on a combination 
of methods to solve identification and authentication, which all have the potential to be 
strengthened by using the e–Passport program.  Depending on the desires and capability 
of the state, e–MTRDs with integrated biometric identifiers can be used as a standalone 
program or incorporated into other existing state structures.  The incorporation of 
biometric identifiers into the documents brings a twofold benefit: (1) identities can be 
validated and screened upon creation of the e–MRTD; and (2) assuming successful 
creation, the document can be subsequently verified at all other portions of the 
immigration process.  The potential to create a fraudulent document substantially 
decreases as individuals are required to furnish biometric data at the onset, which is often 
screened and validated prior to document creation.  Similarly, the ability to subsequently 
alter the document is substantially more difficult than traditional passports.  These 
security measures provide the potential to identify and prevent known malevolent actors 
from acquiring the means to cross state borders. 
Once an e–MRTD is successfully created, the proposed application 
methods for using the devices outlined by ICAO are commonly known as a two, three, or 
                                                 
110 International Civil Aviation Organization, Machine Readable Travel Documents: Specifications 
for Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification Capability, II–12. 
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four–way check.111  The numerical descriptor references the number of independent 
sources that an e–MRTD biometric identifier is compared against and suggests that the 
larger the number, the more comprehensive and potentially accurate the verification.  The 
two–way check will be nearly universal to all states but the three–way check will be 
highly dependent on the state’s ability to incorporate a biometric database into the 
identity solution.  The U.S. and EU already have comprehensive databases for this 
purpose, which integrate well with their specific biometric systems.  Although states will 
most likely employ vastly different identification systems based on their database 
capabilities, the two–way check will remain a common capability—as will the traditional 
ability to visually compare the individual presenting the eMRTD with their physical 
appearance.  The following table summarizes these different applications and how they 
could possibly be implemented in solving the identification problem. 
 
Table 5.   ICAO Proposed Applications for Biometric Solutions 
Despite the selected application and the comprehensiveness of checks that 
states opt to perform, the development and use of e–MRTDs certainly has the potential to 
improve the validity and reliability of passports when verifying identity in the 
immigration and border control process.  Creating a permanent biometric tie between the 
document and the holder that is able to be consistently verified and used for 
authentication is much improved over the traditional methods of visual verification.  The 
e–MRTD can be used to validate identity at each step and when combined with a storage 
capability, the process can be used to validate the continuity of identity throughout the 
                                                 
111 International Civil Aviation Organization, Machine Readable Travel Documents: Specifications 
for Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification Capability, II–9. 
ICAO Proposed Applications for Biometric Solutions 
 
Type of Check Biometric Matched Between These Sources 
Two–Way Livescan–eMRTD 
Three–Way Livescan–eMRTD–State Database(s)  
Four–Way Livescan–eMRTD–State Database(s)–Visual Inspection 
 
Adapted from ICAO Document 9303, Machine Readable Passports Volume II, 2008. 
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immigration process.  The e-MRTD also provides a common template for biometric 
identifiers that can be used in conjunction with proprietary databases in a variety of 
screening applications.  Overall, the e–Passport program is furthering the case of 
verifiable identity by incorporating the reliability and permanence of biometrics into 
common travel documents. 
2. US–VISIT Program—Improving Screening 
Incorporating adequate security into immigration and border control programs 
relies equally on identity verification, authentication, and authorization.  Identity 
verification provisions have been addressed by international standards, but authentication 
and authorization are largely left up to individual states.  The functions of tracking and 
screening have always been priorities in immigration and border control, however, the 
implementation of timely and accurate capabilities has long suffered from the problem of 
verifiable identity.  To better solve these identity issues, states are beginning to refine 
authentication and authorization processes using biometric identifiers and integrated 
information sharing.   
Concerns about sufficiently screening and accurately tracking immigrants has 
long been an issue in the U.S. and the events of 9/11 served to intensify the call for better 
methods to protect our citizens from terrorism stemming from abroad.112  With 
immigration processes that were already under scrutiny, the U.S. rapidly implemented 
biometric based technologies aimed at improving immigrant screening form traditional 
nomenclature methods to advanced biometric databases that were increasingly integrated 
and could capitalize on a number of identification characteristics.113  These advances 
illustrate the increased screening capabilities that can benefit from biometric  
 
                                                 
112 Keith A. Rhodes and Gregory C. Wilshusen, Information Security: Homeland Security Needs to 
Immediately Address Significant Weaknesses in Systems Supporting the US-VISIT Program: Report to 
Congressional Requesters (Washington, D.C: GAO-07-870, July 2007), 4, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07870.pdf (accessed 12 July 2010). 
113 Lisa M. Seghetti and Stephen R. Viña, U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 
(US-VISIT) Program (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, January 
2006), http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL32234.pdf (accessed 09 December 2009). 
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identification technologies.  The following section discusses changes in the U.S. 
immigration programs in recent years to illustrate the use of biometric identifiers and 
databases in screening applications. 
Administered by the Department of Homeland Security, the United States Visitor 
and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–VISIT) program was specifically 
designed to integrate biometrics into the immigration process and provide increased 
security along our national borders by improving the tracking and screening ability of our 
immigration systems.114  US–VISIT sought to capitalize on the newly developed 
biometric identification technologies in order to improve U.S. border screening 
mechanisms.  Eventually the program will also incorporate a reliable entry/exit tracking 
capability for all U.S. immigrants.115 The basic premise of the US–VISIT program is that 
biometric identifiers, primarily fingerprints and digital photographs, can be used to 
identify and subsequently screen all individuals attempting to enter the U.S. through 
comprehensive and inter–related databases, which will gather, store, and share biometric 
identifiers. 
The requirement for this type of program actually began prior to the events of 
9/11 and was centered on the call for an entry/exit program for foreign nationals under 
the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).116  
This legislation later combined with several federal mandates from the Dept of Justice, 
the USA PATRIOT Act117 and HSPD–6118 all of which eventually led to the mandatory 
inclusion of biometric information and forcing information sharing between federal 
                                                 
114 The various laws creating and governing US–VISIT can be found in the Federal Register (Volume 
73, Number 245) dated 19 December 2008; Page 77473. 
115 U.S. Dept of Homeland Security, US-VISIT Biometric Identification Services. 
116 §110 of IIRIRA is located in Division C of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
FY1997. United States Congress, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Congress, 1996). 
117 As per Public Law 107-56, 115 Stat. 271, 353 (26 October 2001). 
118 United States, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD–6 Integration and use of 
Screening Information (Washington, D.C: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 16 September 
2003), http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1214594853475.shtm#1. 
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systems.119  Implemented in 2002, the US–VISIT system collects biometric identifiers 
(currently 10 digit fingerprints and a facial photograph) from specific visa applicants and 
then accesses several different databases to effectively screen intending immigrants.120  
Since the creation of DHS, and the corresponding awareness of intelligence integration 
through the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), biometric screening seems to making large 
strides in identifying and disseminating potential terrorist or security indicators 
Proponents of the US–VISIT insist that it serves as another layered defense 
against terrorist attacks upon our nation by increasing the ability to identify and hold 
accountable the many visa applicants intending some sort of harm or potentially 
attempting to enter the U.S. illegally.121  On the other hand, opponents consistently point 
out the overwhelming expense of the system itself as well as the general infringement 
upon civil rights associated with the program.122  Despite the stance, many authors and 
citizens have rightfully questioned the amount of money being dedicated to biometric 
screening and question the systems capability.123 
a. Origins of U.S. Screening 
The task of successfully screening all U.S. immigrants falls largely upon 
three distinct agencies—the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ).124  The detailed processes 
associated with immigrant identity verification and screening responsibility falls 
                                                 
119 Rhodes and Wilshusen, Information Security: Homeland Security Needs to Immediately Address 
Significant Weaknesses in Systems Supporting the US–VISIT Program: Report to Congressional 
Requesters. 
120 Amoore, Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror, 339. 
121 Baldaccini, Counter-Terrorism and the EU Strategy for Border Security: Framing Suspects with 
Biometric Documents and Databases, 49; Woodward, Using Biometrics to Achieve Identity Dominance in 
the Global War on Terrorism, 3. 
122 L. O'Brien, "DHS Biometric Program in Trouble," Wired, 26 February 2007, 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2007/02/72792 (accessed 22 January 2010). 
123 Ackleson, Securing through Technology? "Smart Borders" After September 11th, 70; Amoore, 
Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror, 337. 
124 Michael John Garcia and Ruth Ellen Wasem, Immigration: Terrorist Grounds for Exclusion of 
Aliens (Washington, DC: Congressional Information Service and the Library of Congress, May 2005), 2, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/48380.pdf (accessed 12 July 2010). 
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primarily upon two separate agencies, the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA), which issues 
visas (under DOS), and Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (under DHS), which is 
tasked with inspecting all immigrants at our borders or points of entry.125  Between these 
two agencies, immigrants are subjected to identity creation and authentication along with 
comprehensive background checks to determine suitability of visa issuance and then a 
subsequent screening at the physical border.  Biometric identification is now being 
integrated throughout the process to ensure accurate identity creation and authentication 
during both the initial screening process and again to at the border. 
Before digitized biometric identifiers were available for use in travel 
documents or screening systems, these agencies relied upon screening methods that relied 
on “name checks” typically using locally available information and various watchlists 
specifically constructed for the purpose of keeping out “undesirables”.  This data 
intensive process was typically conducted by a Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) 
interviewer at a foreign embassy often with limited resources and time.  Often this 
process required checking several different databases and local sources prior to 
determining suitability for acceptance and visa issuance.126  Although watch lists were 
being used by the as part of the screening process well before computers became 
commonplace, the data was often compiled without any regular consultation or 
verification between other applicable agencies.   
In 1987, the primary database used by the DOS for terrorist screening was 
known as TIPOFF, it was loosely tied to some other sources of information.  Figure 1 
below shows some of the structural ties between this early database and the other systems 
with which it interfaced.127 
                                                 
125 William J. Krouse, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Under Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD–6) (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2004), 5–16, 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA445120 (accessed 19 January 2010). 
126 John J. Tkacik Jr., "Why the Department of Homeland Security should Control Visas," The 
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, no. 1569 (2002), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/BG1569.cfm#pgfId-998924 (accessed 08 March 
2010); Spencer S. Hsu, "U.S. Preparing to Drop Tracking of Foreigners' Departures by Land," The 
Washington Post, sec. 1, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/12/15/AR2006121500092.html (accessed 05 March 2010). 
127 The Terrorist Watchlist Connectivity Diagram in Figure 1 was adapted from a 2004 Department of 
State presentation and printed by Congressional Research Service. See: Krouse, Terrorist Identification, 
Screening, and Tracking Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD–6). 
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Figure 1.   Pre HSPD–6 Terrorist Watchlist Connectivity Diagram. 
Although the screening system was not terribly robust, the focus at the 
time was placed on the efficiency and speed of processing applications.  These systems 
were often developed individually and had accessibility problems preventing meaningful 
information exchange—primarily due to differing classification levels between the 
separate systems.  Preventing terrorism had not come to the forefront of many of these 
agencies until the second bombing of the world trade center in 2001, which highlighted 
several of the interoperability problems between TIPOFF and other related databases.  
This disastrous attack largely served as the impetus for increasing information sharing 
and improving U.S. watch list capabilities.128  As a result, the TIPOFF based screening 
methods and our ability to track immigrants entering the U.S. came under heavy scrutiny 
as many of the 9/11 hijackers either slipped through the immigrant screening process 
despite having terrorist indicators or violated the limits prescribed by their U.S. visas.  
These events helped solidify the call for using biometric methods to ensure verifiable 
identity, reliable screening, and entry/exit tracking. 
                                                 
128 Eldridge, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States. 
 
 
Adapted from:  Krouse in CRS Report for Congress (RL32366), Terrorist Identification, 
Screening and Tracking Under HSPD–6. 
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b. U.S. Screening Under HSPD–6 
In an effort to address some of these shortcomings and in turn enhance our 
ability to detect and prevent terrorist activity, the Bush administration released HSPD–6 
in 2003.129  The guidance contained in HSPD–6 aims to increase the emphasis on 
terrorist intelligence gathering and information sharing between agencies, improve the 
U.S. ability to share credible information, pass information between agencies, and 
facilitate access to appropriate information for the agencies responsible for terrorist 
screening duties.130  The most notable contribution of HSPD–6 was the creation of a 
centralized database containing all available information on known or suspected terrorists 
known as the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which can be accessed by all 
applicable U.S. agencies.  The agency responsible for maintaining the TSDB and 
handling all functions pertaining to U.S. watchlist activities is the Terrorist Screening 
Center (TSC.)  Making the TSC central to the screening process encouraged the use of 
common architecture and facilitates the sharing of information between agencies at all 
levels of the spectrum—including national, state, local, and tribal jurisdictions.  The 
resulting structure and mandated agency interaction prescribed by HSPD–6 is illustrated 
in the figure below. 
                                                 






Figure 2.   Terrorist Identification and Watch Listing Under HSPD–6.131 
As the focal point for U.S. immigration screening activities, the TSC is 
highly reliant on the ability to gather, share, and fuse intelligence data—then in turn, pass 
actionable information to distributed agencies, mainly end user screeners.  The TSC 
maintains a 24–hour call center that assists screening agencies when individuals are 
flagged as being a match to the TSDB and ensure the appropriate agency is able to handle 
the specific problem.  The creation of the TSC can be considered a large success in 
streamlining screening functions as evidenced by the volume of terrorist watchlist 
matches that have been documented.132  In addition to terrorist watchlist matches, other 
agencies are also reaping the benefit of improved tracking and identification of U.S. 
immigrants.  Overall, the U.S. immigration enforcement agencies are credited with well 
                                                 
131 Inter-agency flowchart as printed in - Krouse, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking 
Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD–6). 
132 “Between December 2003 and May 2007, the TSC has documented more than 99,000 encounters 
for which its call center was contacted, with over 50% of the calls being a positive match to a terrorist 
watchlist identity.”  U.S. Department of Justice, Follow Up Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center 
(Washington, DC: Audit Report 07–41, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, September 2007), 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0741/final.pdf (accessed 11 August 2010). 
 
 
Adapted from:  Krouse in CRS Report for Congress (RL32366), Terrorist Identification, Screening and Tracking 
Under HSPD–6. 
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over 500,000 immigration related apprehensions per year.133  The ability for a state to 
create, maintain, and quickly access reliable information that can be used in screening 
functions is becoming a mandate in protecting state borders.  Successful screening 
mechanisms directly support immigration enforcement actions and this integrated 
structure allows all agencies faced with an identity problem to quickly access the required 
information to make an appropriate decision.  Overall, HSPD–6 has furthered the 
capability for all U.S. agencies to share critical information and greatly enhanced 
screening programs that should reduce the likelihood that a known suspect could easily 
penetrate the U.S. border with the intention to conduct criminal or terrorist activities. 
3.  U.S. Visa and Immigration Refusals 
Measuring the effectiveness or quantification of biometric identification in 
immigration can be difficult, but there are some signs that the U.S. is seeing tangible 
successes after the inclusion of biometrics through US–VISIT and the improved 
watchlisiting capabilities under HSPD–6.  Exploring the quantitative change in U.S. 
immigration enforcement actions in the areas of security and terrorism should illustrate 
how the incorporation of biometric identifiers into the primary U.S. identification and 
screening mechanisms has influenced the effectiveness of our border security measures.  
The ability to deny entry to an increasing number of applicants based upon verifiable 
identification and screening procedures is certainly one desired result of incorporating 
biometric identification into immigration and border control programs.  This measure 
may not be the most precise or accurate indicator of the contributions of biometric 
identifiers in the immigration process, but it seems to be a common performance metric 
presented by states as a way to assign merit to biometric identification and screening.  
The supported hypothesis is that changes in biometric identification and screening have 
enabled the U.S. to prosecute and deny increasing numbers of immigrants for security 
and terrorism concerns. 
                                                 
133 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2009 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Immigration Statistics, 2009), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_2009.pdf. 
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The rigorous U.S. screening process is designed to maintain security by not 
allowing nefarious individuals to gain access to U.S. borders.  The Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (INA) contains all the laws that govern the U.S. visa refusal 
categories, of which this study will only consider the number of ineligible immigrants 
from the Security and Terrorism category, as defined by each individual law listed 
below:134 
212(a)(3)(A)(i) Espionage, Sabotage, Technology Transfer 
212(a)(3)(A)(ii) Other Unlawful Activity 
212(a)(3)(A)(iii) Activity to Overthrow the U.S. Government 
212(a)(3)(B) Terrorist Activities 
212(a)(3)(C) Foreign Policy 
212(a)(3)(D)(i) Immigrant Membership in a Totalitarian Party 
212(a)(3)(E)(i) Participation in Nazi Persecutions 
212(a)(3)(E)(ii) Participation in Genocide 
 
The ability of the U.S. to identify ineligibles as they are subjected to the biometric 
screening process will be assessed using available open source data, using the U.S. 
Department of State report on Annual Visa Ineligibles.135  The annual numbers of 
ineligibles will be compared against the backdrop of biometric developments within the 
U.S. programs.  The two major developments in screening during this time period were 
the inception of biometric identifier collection through US–VISIT in early 2002, and the 
subsequent changes to the screening programs that occurred through the implementation 
of HSPD–6 in late 2003.  Each program has evolved since inception, but 2002 will be 
used as the definitive timeframe where biometric identifiers were compensatory for U.S. 
immigrants and 2004 will be the first year where the improvements of HSPD–6 could be 
considered to have been effective.  The analysis of annual ineligibles will be assessed 
both as a whole and keeping in mind the developments in U.S. immigration associated 
with these dates.  The annual numbers of ineligibles will also be normalized over the 
number of immigrant applications in order to account for quantitative changes in 
                                                 
134 § 212(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 
135 Can be found at http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/statistics/statistics_1476.html.  
 65
immigration activities.  These constraints should allow for an objective and quantifiable 
analysis of the effectiveness of U.S. immigration and border control agencies at 
preventing entrance to individuals known to pose a credible threat to U.S. security. 
The last section has shown how after HSPD–6, the Bureau of Consular Affairs 
agent adjudicating visas for foreign applicants now has access to many of the biometric 
screening databases through their respective database with potentially more accurate and 
integrated information.  Although, U.S. visa refusals have traditionally relied on 
information from U.S. databases, the advent of biometric screening brings with it the 
prospect of information sharing with other states and localities.  The ability to share data 
outside the conventional agencies, incorporate foreign government biometrics databases, 
and access other agencies captured biometrics should provide increased capability to 
refuse immigration benefits to potential terrorists or known criminals.  This is creating a 
vested interest in sharing data between states as many believe this will yield collective 
security gains. 
The U.S. has always sought to protect its borders against known terrorist threats, 
but also places an importance on maintaining a fair and unbiased system that supports fair 
and robust immigration.  The grounds for inadmissibility under the INA security and 
terrorism concern are aimed at individuals who “have engaged or intend to engage in 
terrorist activity either as an individual or as a member of a terrorist organization.”136  
Although the specific reasons that individuals denied entry are not discernable nor are 
they releasable to the public, the aggregate numbers for each category are regularly 
published and updated.  The following chart contains the collective numbers from the 
“Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visa Ineligibilities” section of the Report of the Visa 
Office available from the U.S. Dept of State website.137 
                                                 
136 Ruth Ellen Wasem, Immigration Visa Issuances and Grounds for Exclusion Policy and Trends 
(Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, March 2010), 13, 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41104_20100310.pdf (accessed 27 March 2010). 
137 U.S. Dept of State, "Visa Statistics: Report of the Visa Office," 
http://www.travel.state.gov/visa/statistics/statistics_1476.html (accessed 14 October 2010). 
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Figure 3.   U.S. Visa Ineligibles for Security and Terrorist Concerns. 
Analyzing the data for U.S. ineligibles, it is apparent that there is an increasing 
trend in the cumulative numbers of individuals denied entry at our borders across the 
entire period.  There are also some categorical changes between different individual INA 
categories.  Since biometric screening became fully integrated in 2004, there appears to 
be marked increases in the area of Espionage, Sabotage, Technology Transfer and the 
area of Terrorist Activities.  Arguably these areas could receive the greatest benefit from 
biometric screening and database integration.  One notable issue that can now be 
addressed through these technologies is an applicant who attempts to gain a U.S. visa 
through multiple applications, often with different names.  With the incorporation of 
biometric information on each visa application, name is no longer the primary 
identification method and now these offenders can be readily identified through 
biometrics and subsequently denied entry, depending on the circumstances.138 
                                                 
138 Biometric Example - “A female Peruvian, married to a British National, applied for a UK 
settlement visa in Spain. She said that she had not applied for a UK visa before, however a biometric check 
revealed a match to a male applicant for a visa in Madrid earlier in the year. When interviewed she said the 
male applicant was her brother but was unable to explain the fingerprint match. Further examination of 
travel documents revealed that she had made a previous application, which had been refused, using her 
brother's passport but replacing his photograph with hers. The second application was also refused.”  M2 
Presswire, Ten Point Plan for Border Protection and Immigration Reform; First Milestone Met as 
Fingerprint Checks Go Global., 1.  
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Perhaps the most pronounced change is between 2002 and 2005, where US–
VISIT began collecting and processing biometric identifiers from all U.S. immigrants.  
These four years show increases in cumulative numbers denied entry as well as distinct 
increases in the category Espionage, Sabotage and Technology Transfer.  Looking closer 
at this category, there were 14 individuals denied entry in 2000—which increased to 213 
individuals by 2008.  This area shows both cumulative and progressive increases in 
denials since the incorporation of biometric identifiers through US–VISIT, as well as the 
improved information sharing under HSPD–6.  The second most notable characteristic is 
the increases in terrorist based refusals that began in 2006 and extended through 2008.  
Refusals based on the terrorism concern had remained fairly steady from 2000–2004, but 
then exhibit large increases in the years 2004–2008.  This would be an expected result of 
a vastly improved and comprehensive watchlist system that began operating in 2003.  
These two increases would be indicative of the expected benefits from achieving better 
identification solutions and being able to more accurately prosecute screening activities. 
Positively attributing these increases to either US–VISIT or the TSC would 
require much more specific information, but as a collective result, it certainly appears that 
there are noticeable increases in terrorist based refusals that are evident immediately after 
these programs commenced operation.  These increases in refusals in these two areas 
while all others remain relatively steady certainly indicate that there may be some 
connection between biometric identification and improved screening and the U.S. ability 
to refuse entry to immigrants that may be capable of posing a security risk.   
In addition to analyzing the cumulative increases in refusals, there can also be 
some interpretation of the general trends that may useful in discerning the reasons behind 
these increases in visa refusals.  Taking the same refusal data and plotting a trend line 
based on the moving average depicted below, shows a steady trend of increasing refusals 
immediately after the implementation of biometric screening and database integration.   
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Figure 4.   Terrorism and Security Refusal Trend Line. 
By using the moving average, trends over time are better reflected around the 
endpoints.  This allows us to analyze the available data immediately around the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and more accurately draw out the trends after the implementation of 
biometric screening in 2002 and improved screening mechanisms in 2004.  One 
interesting observation is that immediately after the devastating events of 9/11, the rate of 
refusals remained relatively steady.  After such a traumatic attack on our nation, one 
might intuitively assume that U.S. immigration would have been more restrictive in the 
area of terrorism and security.  This data is perhaps the best response to any 
counterarguments that could claim refusals in these areas could be attributed to an 
increased vigilance or perhaps based on prejudiced refusal practices. 
Some could argue that these increases could be due to a variety of factors and 
further information is needed to positively ascertain the role of biometric identification in 
each specific case.  Obviously the release of this information could compromise some of 
the inherent strengths of the identification and screening systems, hence qualitative 
assessments may not be able to be made based on the public data.  This limitation may 
reduce the ability to positively correlate biometric identification or improved screening to 
the discernable increases in refusals, but does not invalidate the presence of these 
increases.   
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Another interpretation of the visa refusal data, which may reinforce the increased 
capability to process terrorist information as it pertains to visa issuance, can be 
represented by the percentage of refusals processed with respect to the number of 
immigration applications.  Normalizing the data in this fashion discounts the fact that the 
increases noted above could be merely achieved by an overall increase in the number of 
intending immigrants.  Figure 5 reflects the total number of INA refusals under security 
and terrorism as a percentage and is plotted against the total annual immigration numbers. 
 
Figure 5.   INA Security and Terrorism Refusal Percentages. 
Normalizing the number of refusals for the total numbers of immigrants shows 
that increases in INA refusals are not attributable to increases in immigration.  This chart 
shows that the total numbers of immigrants has actually decreased slightly over the 
period in question while the actual numbers of refusals has experienced some sharp 
increases.  Translating these observations into immigration and border security terms, the 
data show that a larger percentage of intending immigrants are being denied entry for 
security or terrorism concerns.  These increases also correspond in time to the beginning 
of US–VISIT, as well as the changes to our screening systems under HSPD–6.  This hints 
at an increasing ability to flag immigrants as unsuitable, most likely due to the increasing 
availability of positively identifiable information within the U.S. immigration screening 
systems.   
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The fact that the U.S. is able to deny entry to a greater number of immigrants on 
the basis of validated security and terrorism concerns is one indication that our border 
security measures may be becoming more effective as a result of biometric identification 
and improved U.S. screening mechanisms.  It is important to keep in mind that these 
efforts are only one small part of a comprehensive set of programs designed to prevent 
terrorists from transiting state borders.  Biometric identification in immigration and 
border control is a front line defense aimed at preventing entry to nefarious individuals.  
Once an individual is within the U.S. border, information fusion is allowing successful 
infiltration of these nefarious groups by U.S. agents.139  In border control, or internal 
counterterrorism efforts, it is becoming evident that the most effective way to prevent 
plots is through the collaborative sharing of multi-agency information.  States must be 
able to use information in the immigration and border control process to prevent 
individuals from entering a state and rely upon other agencies to properly use information 
for identifying and preventing attacks that may originate from within the state.  Biometric 
screening, along with many of our counterterrorism tools, plays a pivotal role in 
identifying individuals and preventing their access to states that they intend to harm. 
This chapter illustrates how the biometric identification processes contained with 
the US–VISIT program and HSPD–6 guidelines has positively affected the U.S. 
immigration and border security system.  Capitalizing on the use of biometric identifiers 
in the immigration process has allowed the U.S. to mandate verifiable identity throughout 
the immigration process and create a robust screening process prior to and at the U.S. 
border.  This system has merited several individual successes as well as contributed to 
more effective screening at U.S. borders when taking into account the number of 
effective refusals based on security concerns.  HSPD–6 further incorporated all U.S. 
agencies into the counter terrorism realm by mandating the TSC as well as an improved 
process for collective information sharing.  The ability to share this important data with 
other U.S. agencies allows for a more comprehensive counterterrorism system.  The 
                                                 
139 Germain Difo, Ordinary Measures, Extraordinary Results: An Assessment of Foiled Plots since 
9/11 (Washington DC: American Security Project, 2010), 
http://www.americansecurityproject.org/content/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Foiled-Plots.pdf (accessed 01 
June 2010). 
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ability to harness the reliability of verifiable identification in the immigration process and 
move beyond the nomenclature based screening systems has the potential to enhance 
security throughout the U.S. immigration system.  Following this standard for biometric 
identification, combined with a comprehensive and robust database for screening 
purposes, several other states are now developing proprietary systems for conducting 
extensive identity screening along their borders in hopes of providing increased security 
and protection for their citizens. 
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IV. ASSESSING BIOMETRIC BORDERS 
Increasing numbers of states are turning to biometrics to enhance border and 
immigration screening programs.  As such, it certainly seems evident that biometric 
screening will become an integral part of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.  
Proponents argue that the incorporation of biometric identifiers into the screening process 
helps states to validate individual identities and reduce the ability for individuals to 
falsify travel and identification documents.  Despite the appeal of this claim, no formal 
studies been conducted that attempt to correlate biometric screening with terrorist 
incidents.  This chapter will attempt to provide a foundation for analyzing the relationship 
between biometric screening at state borders and terrorist incidents conducted by foreign 
nationals.  Using the first 20 states that implemented biometric screening programs as the 
target of interest, this chapter will provide a quantitative analysis of biometric screening 
initiatives and terrorist incidents form 1991–2007.  The goal is to begin to develop 
metrics that might be used to assess the contributions of biometric screening programs to 
the reduction of terrorist activities across state borders in order to justify the merit of such 
systems.  Effectively protecting borders with biometric technology will rely on the 
development and implementation of quantitative analytical techniques capable of 
assessing biometric screening initiatives—a topic with very little publication besides 
media reports or industry advocacy. 
This chapter will focus on investigating the relationship between biometric 
screening and terrorist incidents in the following ways: (1) comparing the aggregate 
numbers of (and changes in) terrorist incidents in each state with respect to pre–defined 
biometric periods based on the implementation of biometric borders; (2) conducting a 
graphical analysis of terrorist incidents in each state; and (3) performing a statistical 
correlation of terrorist incidents in each state with the existence of a biometric screening 
program.  Ultimately, this study should provide a foundation for building analytical 
methods that can be used to measure the effectiveness of biometric borders, their role in 
state security and their utility in the fight against international terrorism. 
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A. BIOMETRIC SCREENING 
Biometric screening initiatives are continually growing in number, expanding in 
scope and consistently adding new capabilities.  Currently, there are over 60 states that 
have incorporated biometric screening into their border protection plans, many using the 
commonly established machine readable travel documents as defined in the e-Passport 
program.140  The first state to establish a national biometric screening program was 
Malaysia in 1998 with several others that followed suit in 2004–2006, many of which 
were spurned by the deadline to participate in the U.S. Visa Waiver Programme.141  
In order to effectively analyze biometric screening in relation to terrorist 
incidents, it is necessary to be mindful of the recency of these programs.  In order to keep 
this analysis meaningful with respect to the infancy of many biometric programs, it 
specifically focuses on states that established a biometric screening program on or before 
2006.  While these programs can be considered to be relatively young, this should allow 
adequate time since program implementation to detect perceptible changes in terrorist 
incidents.  Since several of the states in this study implemented programs at different 
times, much of the analysis will be with respect to defined “biometric” time periods 
based on the states program implementation date.  Bounding the analysis in this manner 
is based upon the following facts: (1) the procurement of biometric systems and building 
the corresponding databases often takes place over a number of years;142 (2) depending 
on the visa replacement programs, many states have differing amounts of time where 
individuals can still travel with nonbiometric documents; and (3) the terrorist incident 
dataset does not contain events beyond 2007, which limits analysis beyond this point.  As 
such, this study will focus on the first 20 states to implement biometric  
 
                                                 
140 Find Biometrics, Over 60+ Countries Now Issuing ePassports, 04 June 2010. 
141 International Civil Aviation Organization, Guidelines: Electronic Machine Readable Travel 
Documents & Passenger Facilitation, 8. 
142  Implementation varies with state procedures and is highly dependent on equipment procurement 
as well as the time required to bring all state issued visas into compliance.  The US initiated limited 
biometric screening in 2002, but subsequently maximized screening effectiveness with the creation of the 
TSC in 2004.  
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screening, with program implementation dates between 1998 and 2006.  Table 6 contains 
the entire list of states in considered in this study sorted by their biometric program 
implementation date. 
 
Table 6.   Date Biometric Screening Established. 
The primary data source for terrorist incidents will be the Global Terrorist 
Database (GTD) for the years 1991–2007.143  This database contains detailed reports of 
all recorded incidents that meet the definitions outlined by the National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).  For an event to be 
included into the GTD database, it must meet certain attributes and criteria.  First the 
event must have at least one of the following attributes: (1) the incident must be 
intentional; (2) the incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence; or (3) 
                                                 
143 The GTD is a product of: START – A Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Global Terrorism Database. 
State 
 
Biometric Border Date 
 
Malaysia 3/1/1998 




















the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.144  Additionally, incidents 
must also meet at least two of the following three criteria: (1) the act must be aimed at 
attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; (2) there must be evidence of an 
intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other message to a larger audience than 
the immediate victim; and (3) the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national 
actors.145 
Using the GTD dataset, information from specific events within the states of 
interest will be: (1) standardized by formulation into identifiable terrorist plots for 
continuity of analysis (explained further below); (2) analyzed with respect to time 
periods—including before, during and after biometric screening implementation; (3) 
graphically assessed; and (4) statistically correlated with biometric screening.  The first 
three analytical methods should reveal any existing trends in terrorist incidents in relation 
to the establishment of biometric screening programs, while the final portion will help 
determine strength of any perceptible relationship.  The hypothesis is that biometric 
screening prior to and at state borders should lead to noticeable decreases in terrorist 
incidents—even though biometric screening is only a portion of the entire effort that 
states are beginning to use to counter terrorism. 
1. Defining Biometric Screening Periods 
To effectively compare biometric screening initiatives in place throughout the 
world, it is necessary to identify the date of implementation for each states biometric 
screening program and then define standardized time periods that will be used uniformly 
for the assessment of individual biometric screening initiatives.146  Defining and applying 
biometric screening periods allows for accurate cross-comparison of each state and 
                                                 
144 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism 
Database Codebook 3.0 (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2009), 4, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf (accessed 01 December 2009). 
145 Ibid., 5. 
146 Biometric screening program implementation dates were taken from various sources, mostly 
government published documents and media releases from each individual state.  Once checked for 
accuracy, the implementation dates used in this analysis were the same as in: Find Biometrics, Over 60+ 
Countries Now Issuing ePassports, 04 June 2010. 
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ensures that the analysis of events with respect to implementation is standardized across 
the different programs.  Ultimately the events in the GTD will be separated by the state 
where the incident occurred and assessed with respect to three separate time periods 
calculated based on the biometric screening implementation date. 
These time periods can be defined as: (1) a prebiometric screening period before 
program implementation; (2) a transition period defined as the implementation date and 
extending for 2 full years; and (3) a post-biometric screening period defined as the end of 
the transition period to present.  The prebiometric screening period can be best defined as 
the timeframe where states were using nomenclature or nondigitized identity verification 
forms, a practice that entails using nonmachine readable visas without incorporated 
biometric identifiers.  The transition period is defined as beginning in the year that a state 
reports the implementation of a biometric based screening program at their national 
borders and continues for a period of two years.  Defining this transition period is an 
important consideration in evaluating biometric screening effectiveness due to the 
assumption that there is a quantifiable amount of time between the launch of a biometric 
screening program and the moment in time when equipment and procedures will be fully 
in place and operating at an acceptable level of efficiency.  Most states begin issuing the 
new biometric visas on the program implementation date but simultaneously create 
stipulations for travelers to use their existing “nonbiometric” travel documents for a 
specified amount of time.  News articles and literature seem to indicate that most states 
are accomplishing the complete transition of travel documents over a course of about five 
years.  The two years designated in this study as a “transition period” is somewhat less 
than the required time that it would take a government to replace every previously issued 
non-biometric visa, but ample time to allow for screening equipment to be fully 
functional at state borders.  Designating this transition period allows further fidelity to 
focus on the events that take place during the changeover between nonbiometric and 
biometric screening programs.  The period of time after the transition period is designated 
as the biometric screening period and represents the end of the transition period to the 
present, during which it is assumed that previously implemented biometric screening 
programs have continued to operate without interruption.   
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These defined “biometric time periods” will be used as the chronological basis for 
the quantitative assessment of terrorist incidents within each country.  Using these time 
periods will allow for the comparative study of states that may have different program 
implementation dates.  If the addition of biometric identifiers improves the screening 
process by providing better watch list capability and a platform for validating identity and 
genuine documents at the border, then there should be an apparent decrease in terrorist 
incidents after the inception of biometric screening programs.  These decreases may be 
evident in the transition period, but seem most likely to occur in the post-biometric period 
when screening processes are fully operational. 
2. Creating Standardized Database Information 
In order to effectively assess the role of biometric borders in these countries using 
the GTD dataset, it is necessary to first standardize and clarify the raw data in order to 
properly identify and isolate the population of interest in a precise and consistent manner.  
Events contained in the dataset were analyzed with respect to the identifying information 
and put into a context that would best allow a high-fidelity analysis.  The GTD dataset is 
largely based on the attack or event specifics but contains relatively little personally 
identifiable information associated with each event.  From this perspective, it made sense 
to consolidate some of the separate events that were clearly identifiable as a single plot as 
well as eliminate events that could be readily identified as originating from within a states 
own borders.  It also became clear that in several cases, identifying the known perpetrator 
would prove elusive resulting in the creation of two separate datasets.  One dataset is 
focused on known perpetrators who have crossed an international border to perpetrate an 
attack and the other is a group of unknown perpetrators whose origin could not be 
determined using the information contained within the dataset.  The following details the 
numbers of events contained in the database and describes the modifications that were 
made to the dataset and the decisions for ultimately using two separate datasets in this 
assessment.  
For the context of this study, the decision was made to consolidate events within 
the dataset in to readily identifiable terrorist plots, a practice not necessarily used within 
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the GTD dataset.147  This decision was based on: (1) the nature of the event data within 
the dataset; (2) the generally accepted public context of terrorist incidents as being 
categorized and discussed in terms of recognized plots rather than by separate 
individuals; and (3) the inability to determine individual perpetrators from many events 
within the dataset.  This also enables a reasonable method to measure aggregate terrorist 
incidents in a commonly accepted and understandable terminology.  For example, the 
9/11 attack against the U.S. is coded in the GTD dataset as four events based on the 
airplanes striking four targets.  Rather than translating these events into twenty separate 
incidents based on perpetrators or remaining as four separate incidents based on targets, it 
will be treated as a single incident aligned with a single plot.  All events in the dataset 
were adjusted in this manner, as applicable, using mainly the following three pieces of 
information: (1) the date and nature of the attack; (2) perpetrator information; and (3) 
attack location.  If there was not enough information to categorize similar attacks into a 
plot, events were left as reported in the original dataset.  While this inherently reduces the 
total numbers, it makes logical sense when comparing aggregate terrorist incidents and 
should allow for a more commonly accepted terminology when expressed in counter 
terrorism terms.  Another important administrative note is that the GTD data for 1993 
was extrapolated in order to addresses the unavailability of data for this specific year (for 
reasons explained in the GTD codebook.)148  The following table lists the total number of 
events for the states of interest that were identified within the dataset at the outset of this 
research. 
                                                 
147 National Counterterrorism Center, 2009 Report on Terrorism (Washington, DC: National 
Counterterrorism Center, 2010), 3, http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2009_report_on_terrorism.pdf 
(accessed 07 August 2010). 
148 The GTD dataset does not contain any data for 1993 due to errors in processing and handling 
information between moves from one location to another—this is explained in the GTD codebook.  For this 
study, incident data for 1993 was fabricated using an extrapolation from the year before (1992), and the 
year after (1994) and should not significantly affect the results or analysis. 
 80
 
Table 7.   Raw Database Events by State of Interest. 
Although using the GTD dataset limits this study in currency to the bound of the 
2007 information, there are few alternatives to remedy this until the database is updated 
and expanded to include follow on data.  There has been a limited update to the GTD 
dataset, which includes data through 2008, but at the present time, this data is missing 
many of the necessary categorical identifiers that would allow the 2008 events to be 
vetted in a similar fashion as the 1991–2007 data.  Alternatively, other databases are 
available that contain similar information such as the National Counterterrorism Centers 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), but the criteria for including events into 
this specific database is constantly changing and does not allow for the similar vetting of 
individual incidents.  As such, even the WITS manual discourages users from attempting 
Raw Database Events by State of Interest 







 Australia 43  
 Austria 36  
 Belgium 40  
 Denmark 13  
 D. Republic 41  
 France 285  
 Germany 550  
 Iceland 0  
 Japan 123  
 Malaysia 8  
 Monaco 0  
 New Zealand 10  
 Norway 9  
 Pakistan 2198  
 Portugal 6  
 Singapore 3  
 Sweden 31  
 Thailand 798  
 UK 241  
 USA 382  
 Total Events of Interest 4817  
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to make annual comparisons using the WITS data.149  The constraints imposed by using 
only GTD data are accepted here in order to attain the best fidelity and continuity of 
information. 
3. Identifying the Population of Interest 
It is also necessary to focus the dataset on the appropriate population, which will 
allow an analysis of international terrorist incidents in relation to biometric screening 
along national borders.  The population of this study is purposely intended to be those 
terrorist incidents where an individual or individuals have intentionally crossed an 
international border in order to take part in an attack.  It assumes that the perpetrator 
crosses the border through a legal method at a time that is proximal to the terrorist 
incident and that the perpetrator attempted to cross the border with the use of a visa and 
passport for travel (either genuine or falsified.)  While this study does not assess or 
include illegal immigration, it recognizes that it is a certainly viable and a potential 
counter to biometric screening initiatives. 
Isolating terrorist incidents with an implied border crossing from the GTD dataset 
is somewhat difficult due to the often incomplete information provided with each 
incident.  For the purpose of this study, the determination to include specific incidents 
was made by identifying the location of the terrorist incident, the reported perpetrator, 
and then determining if the perpetrator would have been subject to screening prior to 
committing the attack.  If the perpetrator is not found to be indigenous to the area where 
the incident occurred, then it is assumed that the perpetrator would have been subject to 
the process of obtaining a visa, travel documents, and subsequently crossing a state 
border to accomplish the attack.  The screening process (biometric or otherwise) is 
assumed to take place through these activities, both at the time of visa application and at 
the actual border crossing.  The primary focus of this study will be terrorist incidents 
where the perpetrator can be reasonably assumed to have originated outside the state 
border. 
                                                 
149 National Counterterrorism Center, 2009 Report on Terrorism, 5. 
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To identify the terrorist incidents of interest, perpetrator information associated 
with each event from the GTD dataset will be primarily evaluated by assessing the group 
or individual name and in some instances, the target type.  The “Country_txt” and 
“Gname” identifiers will be the two primary items used to determine whether a 
perpetrator originated within a state and would have been subject to screening prior to 
committing the attack. Perpetrator Information and other data coding classifications are 
explained in the GTD data codebook.150  Groups or individuals known to be located 
within the state where the attack took place will not be considered to have crossed an 
international border to commit the attack and would not be considered relevant in 
assessing the screening process.  Conversely, any groups or individuals that are known to 
be located outside of the state where the attack took place were assumed to have crossed 
an international border to commit the attack.  Where the perpetrator origin is missing or is 
for some reason unclear, other identifying information associated with the individual 
incident was used to attempt to determine the origin of the perpetrator.   
Although the information used in this process (typically the Attack and Target 
information) varied for individual incidents, most events were relatively straight forward 
to discern the nature and origin of the attacker.  For example, there were a number of 
U.S. incidents with limited or incomplete perpetrator information and which were not 
claimed by any certain group.  Upon discovering that the targets associated with these 
attacks were found to be various abortion clinics, these events were disregarded with 
relatively high confidence that the perpetrator most likely originated from within the 
state.  Other examples were attacks perpetrated by disgruntled citizens (Oklahoma City 
bombing by Timothy McVeigh), or home based terrorist organizations (such as the IRA 
throughout the UK.)  These groups would not have been subject to any sort of watch 
listing or identity screening at any point prior to their attacks and hence screening 
(biometric or otherwise) would never have had the possibility to intervene before the 
group or individual was able to perpetrate the terrorist attack.  Eliminating the identified 
terrorist incidents that were performed by indigenous groups within the state specific 
                                                 
150 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism 
Database Codebook 3.0, 55.  
 83
portions of the GTD dataset eliminates these “homegrown plots.”151  The resulting data is 
a collection of incidents perpetrated by individuals that would most likely have been 
subject to a formalized screening process at a national border prior to committing the 
attack.  Purposely identifying this population ensures the analysis is focused on screening 
mechanisms at state borders.  The results of this process yielded the events in the column 
labeled “No Indigenous” as reported in Table 8.  
Despite concerted efforts to eliminate terrorist incidents that were found to  
originate from within the state, there were still several remaining events within the 
dataset that were coded by perpetrator information described as either “Unknown” or 
“Other,” with little additional information by which to positively identify perpetrator.  
With a dataset that contained nearly 2000 incidents of interest, events categorized as 
perpetrated by an “Unknown/Other” made up anywhere from 50% to 100% of each states 
total events.  Revisiting the details of each event perpetrated by an actor classified as 
“Unknown/Other” in an effort to further discern the origin of these events proved to be 
exceedingly difficult and arbitrary at best.  For example, nearly 70 attacks were classified 
as an “Unknown” attack committed by an “Unknown” perpetrator.  Looking at the attack 
details seemed to hint that many of these events were most likely performed by 
indigenous personnel as several attacks were armed assaults on private citizens, 
assassinations of local persons, and kidnappings of tourists.  The following table shows 
numbers of attacks perpetrated by the “Unknown/Other” perpetrators as grouped by 
“attack type” to illustrate the numbers and types of events that remained in this 
“Unknown/Other Included” dataset.  
                                                 
151 Most determinations of indigenous groups were made by consulting the exhaustive list of state 
terrorist actors contained in Political Terrorism.  Alex Peter Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political 
Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature (New 
Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 2005). 
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Table 8.   Attack Type Events Committed by “Unknown/Other” Perpetrators. 
Due to the variance of information associated with the remaining events and the 
difficulty in narrowing down the perpetrator identity and/or origin without losing 
potentially valuable data, the decision was made to create two datasets that would be used 
for analysis.  One dataset includes the “Unknown/Other” perpetrators and the other was 
created by eliminating any “Unknown/Other” perpetrators.152  Specifically, conducting 
analysis using both of these datasets will ensure that the overwhelming numbers of events 
perpetrated by an “Unknown/Other” actor are not entirely discounted and that the events 
perpetrated by known foreign perpetrators are analyzed as an independent subset.  Table 
9 depicts the resulting numbers of events for each state of interest as well as the resulting 
databases that will be used for analysis. 
                                                 
152 In order to identify these two different databases within the analysis, they will be labeled 
“Unknown/Other Included” and the “Unknown/Other Excluded.” 
Numbers of Events Committed by 
“Unknown/Other” Perpetrators 
Data from: GTD (1991-2007) 
 
 Attack Type 
 
Number of Events 
 
 Armed Assault 363 
 Assassination 298 
 Bombing/Explosion 702 
 Facility/Infrastructure Attack 149 
 Hijacking 6 
 Unarmed Assault 7 
 Unknown 41 




Table 9.   Dataset Creation and Labeling. 
After reviewing the specific amplifying data associated with the 
“Unknown/Other” attacks, it seemed apparent that a rather large majority of the events 
most likely originated from within the state borders.  Although far from conclusive, the 
information surrounding these attacks, such as target type, attack type, weapon type, 
location, and even the implied magnitude of the attack seemed to indicate that a majority 
of these events were associated with groups or individuals that were indigenous.  Based 
on this, it is the author’s opinion that even though the “Unknown/Other Excluded” 
dataset may eliminate a few potential events that might have truly been international 
terrorist plots, it seems like a more accurate representation of the known  
 
Database Modifications and Labels* 
Data from: GTD (1991-2007) 
 
 State Raw Events Internal Actors 
Removed 




 Australia 43 34 79% 7 
 Austria 36 17 65% 6 
 Belgium 40 24 50% 12 
 Denmark 13 8 50% 4 
 D. Republic 41 23 100% 0 
 France 285 131 74% 33 
 Germany 550 191 59% 39 
 Iceland 0 0 - 0 
 Japan 123 59 88% 7 
 Malaysia 8 7 86% 1 
 Monaco 0 0 - 0 
 New Zealand 10 7 71% 2 
 Norway 9 8 38% 5 
 Pakistan 2198 825 96% 13 
 Portugal 6 6 100% 0 
 Singapore 3 2 100% 0 
 Sweden 31 19 73% 3 
 Thailand 798 313 90% 5 
 UK 241 47 79% 7 
 USA 382 95 80% 18 
 Total 4817 1816  162 




events that originated externally to the state in question.  Despite this assumption, both 
datasets will be evaluated so as to present the most objective view of terrorist incidents 
with respect to state biometric screening programs. 
B. AGGREGATE ANALYSIS 
Once the datasets were narrowed to the incidents of interest, the first portion of 
analysis conducted was a basic aggregate analysis of terrorist incidents with respect to the 
defined biometric screening periods (based on each states individual biometric program 
inception date.)  Individual incidents within each state were analyzed as annual averages 
in each respective time period and the percent decrease is the computation from the 
prebiometric to post-biometric screening periods.  This allows for the comparison of 
annual events before and after biometric screening, for identifying changes in trends 
across time, and for comparing general trends within the different states.  Again, this 
analysis is performed for each dataset, the “Unknown/Other Included” and the 
“Unknown/Other Excluded” as annotated on the figures below. 
1. Unknown/Other Included Dataset 
The generalized result from the aggregate analysis on both datasets shows that all 
but six of the first twenty countries to implement biometric borders exhibit decreases in 
annual terrorist incidents between the years of 1991 and 2007.  Table 10 depicts the 
results from the first aggregate analysis using the “Unknown/Other Included” dataset and 
reports annual terrorist incidents in the predefined biometric time periods with respect to 
the implementation of a biometric screening program.  This provides an initial look at the 
general trend in annual terrorist incidents across the different countries when grouped by 
the defined biometric time periods (before biometric screening, during the transition 
period and after biometric screening.)  The annual averages of terrorist incidents depicted 
show an evident decreasing trend in terrorist incidents over the three time periods, with 
nearly every state experiencing a decrease in annual terrorist incidents during the 
transition period, as well as the post-biometric screening period. 
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Table 10.   Terrorist Incidents per Year (Unknown/Other Included). 
This result reflects terrorist incidents separated into annual averages with respect 
to biometric time periods.  In this dataset, Monaco and Iceland experienced no terrorist 
activity during the entire period of study and hence are not depicted.  The depicted results 
show that an overwhelming number of countries experienced decreases in annual 
incidents over the biometric time periods and only two countries experienced relative 
increases in the average incidents per year.  Of the states that experienced decreases in 
annual terrorist incidents, several experienced a relatively large decrease in average 
annual incidents.  Overall, this comparison shows relative decreases in terrorist incidents 
over the three defined time periods in the majority of the countries even despite the 
inclusion of events in which the perpetrator may have been an internal group or 
individual.  While it is not yet possible to draw conclusions about biometric screening 
solely on this initial aggregate analysis—it is important to illustrate the trend of 
Terrorist Incidents (Events/Year) “Unknown/Other Included” 











Australia 2.82 0.50 0.00 100.00% 
Denmark 0.60 0.50 0.00 100.00% 
Dominican Republic 2.19 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Japan 4.63 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
New Zealand 0.57 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Norway 0.61 0.50 0.00 100.00% 
Portugal 0.50 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Singapore 0.20 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Sweden 1.75 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Germany 15.39 2.00 1.00 93.50% 
Malaysia 1.00 0.00 0.13 87.50% 
USA 7.00 1.00 1.00 85.71% 
France 9.87 1.00 2.00 79.73% 
Belgium 2.12 0.00 0.50 76.36% 
UK 3.60 1.00 1.00 72.22% 
Austria 1.13 1.00 1.00 11.76% 
Pakistan 47.58 36.00 91.00 Increase 
Thailand 8.61 61.50 89.00 Increase 
 
*1816 Incidents (“Unknown/Other Included” for Perpetrators)  
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decreasing terrorist activities in the majority of the states after the implementation of 
biometric borders.  It is also evident from this analysis that Pakistan and Thailand stand 
out from the others in both their increases in annual incidents, as well as their noticeably 
large numbers of incidents, especially in the post-biometric period.  These results 
prompted further analysis into the states with rather large increases in events in order to: 
(1) see if there were any notable characteristics of the incidents particular to these 
countries; and (2) to explore structural or other differences between the states that 
experienced decreases over the same time periods.   
It is immediately evident that both Pakistan and Thailand have at least one portion 
of highly disputed and difficult to control border that is shared with a neighbor state that 
may harbor nefarious actors.153  It was also apparent from the database events that a 
majority of events in these two states seemed to have indicators that would implicate that 
several events stemmed from or passed through these troubled border areas.  From this 
perspective, the porous and difficult to control borders of Pakistan and Thailand seem to 
hamper their biometric screening efforts.154  In these two countries, even after 
eliminating known indigenous events, it still seems that the preponderance of events in 
the “Unknown/Other Included” dataset contain specifics that indicate the events 
originated from groups indigenous to these troubled border regions.  So much so that if 
“likely indigenous” events (for lack of a better term) are discounted; then terrorist activity 
within these two countries nearly ceases to exist.  This highlights the importance of 
assessing the nature of the state borders along which biometric screening is being 
implemented and indicates that biometric screening may have some severe challenges if 
screening along border crossings is not adequately implemented, secured, and enforced.   
 
 
                                                 
153 Jayshree Bajoria, "The Troubled Afghan-Pakistan Border," Council on Foreign Relations 
Backgrounders (20 March 2009), 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/14905/troubled_afghanpakistani_border.html (accessed 09 August 2010). 
154 CNN iReport, "Thai - Burma Border, Crossing for Food." http://www.ireport.com/docs/DOC-
22600 (accessed 06 June 2010); Rizwan Zeb, "Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan-
Afghanistan Relations," China and Eurasia Forum Quaterly 4, no. 2 (2006), 69, 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/May_2006/Zeb.pdf (accessed 29 July 2010). 
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It also brings up the important issue of ensuring that actors are not able to simply 
circumvent the screening process by crossing either undetected or illegally into another 
states territory. 
2. Unknown/Other Excluded Dataset 
In an effort to further refine the analysis of average annual terrorist incidents in 
relation to biometric time periods and focus only on events perpetrated by known 
external actors, the aggregate analysis was computed using the “Unknown/Other 
Excluded” dataset.  The results were again sorted into the defined biometric time periods 
and it initially appears that a greater number of countries achieve an even greater 
decrease in incidents.  Although this dataset eliminates a great number of incidents 
narrowing down to only 168 events, it is most likely the more accurate depiction of 
terrorist incidents were perpetrated by groups that originated externally to the state.  The 
calculated annual averages for the “Unknown/Other Excluded” dataset are displayed in 
the figure below and again grouped by biometric time period.  With this dataset, five 
states had no terrorist incidents throughout the periods—Dominican Republic, Iceland, 
Monaco, Portugal, and Singapore (hence, they are not depicted.)   
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Table 11.   Terrorist Incidents per Year (Unknown/Other Excluded). 
Assessing the annual averages of incidents known to be perpetrated by external 
actors immediately shows a distinct lack of terrorist incidents in the post-post-- biometric 
time period for nearly all states.  Using the same metric of annual averages with the same 
constraints and time periods, the refined dataset shows that all countries experienced a 
decrease in terrorist attacks by known entities with the exception of Malaysia.  Again, 
this dataset shows that the annual averages of terrorist incidents experienced a sharp 
decline in the post-biometric period for nearly all states in the study.  Not only did states 
experience a decrease, many states have not experienced any terrorist incidents in the 
post-biometric period.  While this again is not conclusive evidence that biometric 
screening at borders reduces terrorist incidents, it certainly highlights a positive trend and 
illustrates the fact that annual averages of terrorist incidents are numerically declining. 
By focusing on known perpetrators who were highly suspected to have been 
subjected to screening at a state border, this dataset shows that nearly every state had a 
significant decrease in activity after institution of biometric borders.  Additionally, almost 
every state exhibits a distinct lack of terrorist incidents in the post-biometric period, with 
the exception of the U.S. (which still experienced a 25% reduction in annual averages.)  
Terrorist Incidents (Events/Year) 










Australia 0.68 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Austria 0.47 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Belgium 1.12 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Denmark 0.37 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
France 2.63 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Germany 3.14 0.50 0.00 100.00% 
Japan 0.57 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
New Zealand 0.14 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Norway 0.36 0.50 0.00 100.00% 
Pakistan 1.08 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Sweden 0.25 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Thailand 0.43 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
UK 0.57 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
USA 1.37 0.50 1.00 26.83% 
Malaysia 0.00 0.00 0.13 Increase 
 
* 162 Incidents (“Unknown/Other Excluded” for Perpetrators) 
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As above, these trends are indicative of a reduction in annual terrorist incidents with 
respect to biometric screening, but do not necessarily imply correlation between these 
decreases in terrorist incidents and biometric screening procedures.  The one certainty 
from this focused dataset is that there are evident decreases in average annual terrorist 
incidents over the time period of 1991–2007 for the majority of the countries in question. 
C. GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 
With the exception of Malaysia, most biometric screening programs were put into 
place starting in 2004 in an effort to bring travel documents in line with the new 
requirements for machine readable passports prescribed by the U.S. Visa Waiver 
Programme.  To date, many states continue to implement biometric screening initiatives 
and existing programs are constantly refined (often with biometric identifiers being added 
to existing programs.)  Grouping countries by year provides for programs to be compared 
with respect to their implementation date and the resulting data to be presented in 
graphical form.  Analysis of these charts shows several general trends perceptible 
between 1991 and 2007.  To best analyze and depict the data, the countries will be 
grouped by their biometric start dates, where every state with the exception of Malaysia 





Figure 6.   Biometric Screening—1998 Start Date. 
 
Malaysia was the first state to implement a biometric screening program to secure 
its borders and has very few incidents across the period in question.  In both datasets, 
Malaysia only experienced a single incident after program inception in March 1998.  This 
incident occurred in 2000 during the transition period and Malaysia has subsequently has 
not experienced any incidents (by known or unknown perpetrators) through 2007.  The 
reported incident in Malaysia was a kidnapping event in 2000 conducted by the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG) and was the only terrorist incident by a known foreign entity within 
Malaysia since the inception of biometric screening in 1998.155  The incident involved a 
Philippine terrorist group somehow taking hostages from Malaysia, but it is difficult to 
                                                 
155 GTD dataset event ID# 200004240001 - kidnapping by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), known to 
operate throughout the Philippines. 
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ascertain the specific role of border screening with respect to the incident.  One notable 
piece of information was that one of the hostages was later found to be an internal actor 
of ASG, perhaps indicating that he may have had access to the Malaysian mainland.   
Despite the relative lack of terrorist activity, the fact that an attack occurred 
during the transition period highlights a potential area of concern with biometric 
screening implementation.  Typically, states beginning a biometric screening program 
based on passport documents do not invalidate existing nonbiometric passports that often 
remain valid for travel for up to 5 years.  This method often allows individuals to 
continue to travel without being subject to the biometric screening process for various 
periods, typically between 2–5 years depending on the state.  During the transition period, 
it is expected that several travelers would be able to travel without being subject to 
biometric screening at the border by using documents issued before biometric screening 
implementation.  This is a good case where further information would be needed to 
determine if the members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (the alleged perpetrators), which is 
reportedly based out of southern Philippines were subject to biometric screening at the 
Malaysian border.156  Despite this attack during the transition period, the post--transition 
period is devoid of terrorist incidents indicating that biometric screening may be one of 
the contributing factors maintaining the relative absence of terrorist incidents in 
Malaysia. 
                                                 
156 Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation (Washington 
D.C: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2002), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31265.pdf 
(accessed 04 August 2010). 
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2.  2004—Pakistan and Belgium  
 
 
Figure 7.   Biometric Screening—2004 Start Date. 
After Malaysia, the next group of countries to adopt biometric screening 
procedures began in 2004, which consisted of Belgium, the Dominican Republic and 
Pakistan.  In the “Unk/Other Excluded” dataset, the Dominican Republic did not 
experience any incidents that could be classified as perpetrated by a foreign entity and is 
not included in that corresponding chart.  The overall assessment of these states is that 
both datasets show a mostly decreasing trend.  This trend nearly drops to zero terrorist 
activity for Belgium and the Dominican Republic, but the “Unk/Other Included” dataset 
shows a sharp increase in attacks within Pakistan after the transition period.  These charts 
also illustrate a general downward trend in terrorist incidents that seems to begin in the 
mid 1990s.   
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In the “Unk/Other Included” dataset, Belgium and Pakistan both had terrorist 
incidents after the transition period; a single event in Belgium and about 180 in Pakistan.  
Some considerations when discussing the increasing events in Pakistan are: (1) the 
ongoing war in Afghanistan; (2) the difficulty in implementing border controls along the 
Durand Line; (3) the overall number of events within this state and region; and (4) the 
nature of the events within the “Unk/Other Included” dataset.  First, the ongoing conflict 
within Afghanistan and portions of Pakistan against terrorist groups and Muslim 
extremists undoubtedly affects the overall number of attacks in Pakistan.  As mentioned 
earlier, the region between these two states has traditionally been the origin of numerous 
terrorist attacks (events in Pakistan alone make up nearly half of the entire dataset in 
question.)  The porous nature of the border between these two states, and the difficulty 
that the central governments of both states have in controlling the border also create a 
less than desirable security situation.   
It is also important to remember that many of these events are perpetrated by 
“Unk/Other” perpetrators, whose identities could very well be indigenous.  As noted in 
the aggregate analysis from the dataset review, it seems pretty likely that several of these 
events are not truly international terrorism and probably originate from the troubled 
border regions.  Looking at the nearly 180 attacks after the transition period, 41 were 
against military targets, 23 were targeting police, and 67 were directed solely against 
private citizens.  As an example, the following is a summary of one of the deadliest 
attacks that occurred after the transition period by an “Unk/Other” perpetrator.  This 
specific event occurred in 2007 where several armed assailants (thought to be Islamic 
extremists) fired upon 85 civilians and 10 soldiers at a mosque in Islamabad, Pakistan; no 
specific group claimed the attack and hence it was labeled “Unknown” in line with the 
dataset convention.157  Since events such as these make up a majority of the refined 
dataset, they cannot be disregarded entirely but yet don’t seem to truly fit the convention 
of an international terrorist incident.  Interestingly, when Pakistan is analyzed with the 
“Unk/Other Excluded” dataset, the state shows a decreasing trend in terrorist incidents 
with no events occurring after the inception of biometric screening.  Taking this result 
                                                 
157 GTD dataset event ID# 200707100010. 
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within the context of the different datasets, it essentially shows that there have not been 
any “Known” foreign national perpetrators who successfully conducted a terrorist attack 
within Pakistan since the state established a biometric screening program.   
The other anomaly within the “Unk/Other Included” dataset is the attack in 
Belgium in 2007.  This event was a series of Molotov cocktails that were thrown at a 
number of police stations in the town of Charleroi to which no specific group laid 
claim.158  Again, this specific event is a good example of the large number of events that 
are included in the “Unk/Other Included” dataset but yet are unlikely to be international 
terrorist incidents.  As with the other events in this dataset, there is not enough 
amplifying information to reject events such as this from the dataset entirely but similarly 
not enough data to conclusively say that it was an act of international terrorism.  Despite 
this, both datasets show a marked decline in events within Belgium that began before and 
continued through the implementation of biometric screening programs. 
Overall within the states that instituted biometric screening programs in 2004, the 
incident rates already seemed to be in a steady decline prior to the implementation of 
screening.  It seems that this decreasing trend continued throughout biometric screening 
program implementation, although there is a slight divergence between the trends in 
Pakistan within the two datasets.  Taking these differences into account, when analyzed 
from the perspective positively identified or “Known” international terrorist plots, the 
data show that there have not been any terrorist incidents accredited to a known foreign 
group during either the transition period or the post-biometric period.  This indicates that 
biometric screening in these states may be one factor influencing decreases in terrorist 
incidents, at least those conducted by “Known” foreign groups. 
                                                 
158 GTD dataset event ID# 200702010003. 
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3.  2005—Australia, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Thailand 
 
 
Figure 8.   Biometric Screening—2005 Start Date. 
In 2005, six more countries added biometric screening programs - many of which 
were attempting to meet the U.S. deadline for countries to remain in the U.S. Visa 
Waiver Programme.159   Similar to the state profiles in 2004, most of these countries had 
relatively few terrorist incidents per year with the exception of Thailand and Germany (in 
the “Unk/Other Included” dataset both are on the plotted against the right axis.)  Thailand 
is similar to Pakistan in that they had terrorist incidents that were orders of magnitude 
greater than most of the other countries in this study and nearly all conducted by 
“Unk/Other” perpetrators.  Germany also had nearly four to five times the terrorist 
                                                 
159 U.S. Dept of State, "Visa Waiver Program (VWP)," U.S., 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html (accessed 03 June 2010). 
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incidents per year when compared to the other countries within this group (excluding 
Thailand “Unk/Other Included” events.)  Again, the trend across these states shows what 
seems to be a wide scale decrease in incidents between the years of 1997 and 2002, and 
then only a few sporadic attacks, which again decrease to none at the end of the biometric 
transition period, with the noted exception of the “Unk/Other Included” Thailand dataset.   
Looking first at the “Unk/Other Included” dataset, it is evident that: (1) Thailand 
has a notable increase in incidents slightly before and throughout the transition period 
and (2) all other states have a decreasing trend in attacks that decreases to zero in 2007.  
The situation in Thailand is similar to that of Pakistan; the Thai border can be extremely 
difficult to patrol and has multiple areas that can be breached from neighboring territories 
with ease.  Thailand also suffers from a formidable internal struggle with Muslim 
extremists that shares carryover with other South Asian countries, as well as political 
turmoil that may contribute to the large number of incidents in the GTD.160  Looking 
through the Thailand specific events committed by “Unk/Other” perpetrators, it again 
seems apparent that most of the incidents can be directly attributed to these internal 
conflicts. 
Another issue with the biometric screening processes within Thailand is the slow 
development of the external information sharing and database functions that compliment 
biometric screening processes.  These complimentary programs are now beginning to 
take shape within this region as the state begins to focus more closely on terrorism.  One 
example of this slow development is the fact that Thailand and Malaysia have only 
recently agreed to share biometric information on individuals that may carry dual 
citizenship.  Despite the fact that Malaysia has instituted biometric screening programs as 
early as 1998, this agreement between these two neighbors was only solidified after a 
heavily armed, suspected terrorist group was detained in Southern Thailand with 
                                                 
160 Bahukutumbi Raman, "Terrorism in Southern Thailand: An Update," South Asia Analysis Group 
Paper, no. 1501 (15 October 2005), http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers16%5Cpaper1501.html 
(accessed 27 September 2010). 
 99
substantial sums of Malaysian currency.161  While it may not be apparent to many states 
as they implement biometric programs, screening processes are heavily dependent on 
having accurate and shared data on perpetrators.  Increased cooperation with neighboring 
states and the international community is crucial to have a successful screening program.   
Despite the large numbers of incidents in Thailand within this “Unk/Other 
Included” dataset, it is important to note that nearly all of the other states exhibited 
perceptible decreases in terrorist incidents throughout the time period even when 
including “Unk/Other” perpetrators.  Also in comparing the two datasets, eliminating the 
“Unk/Other” perpetrators from the dataset nearly eliminates all the recent activity within 
Thailand (similar to the situation in Pakistan above.)  The large disparity between these 
two datasets that is evident only within Pakistan and Thailand is obviously related to 
perpetrator identity and may indicate some problems beyond border control or internal 
conflicts within these states.  In addition to the problems of identifying perpetrators in the 
midst of such a large number of overall events within this state, the overwhelming 
number of “Unk/Other” incidents may indicate other deficiencies that may be on the side 
of the state or possibly the terrorist organizations.  Looking at the states, these disparities 
may stem from a lack of counterterrorism investigation capabilities or agencies.  On the 
other hand, if these “Unk/Other” events are truly terrorist activities, it could also be 
indicative of a lack of media capitalization on the part of terrorist organizations within 
these two states.  While it is not possible to determine the exact reasoning for the large 
number of “Unk/Other” events within these two countries, there seems to still be 
perceptible trend data that can be analyzed with respect to biometric screening. 
Turning to the “Unk/Other Excluded” dataset, there are again a smaller number of 
overall incidents all committed by what may be considered “known” groups.  Overall, 
there is again a decreasing trend in terrorist incidents that decreases to zero after the 
transition period.  In this dataset, it is reasonable to address each indecent that occurred 
since the inception of biometric borders to try to ascertain any individual relevance to 
                                                 
161 "Malaysia–Thailand to use Biometric Identification to Check on Dual Citizenship," The Star 
Online, sec. Nation, 29 March 2007, 
http://www.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2007/3/29/nation/20070329142754&sec=nation (accessed 
27 September 2010). 
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biometric screening programs.  Specifically, there are two attacks that took place during 
the transition period, which warrant investigation; one in Norway and one in Germany.   
The attack in Norway was perpetrated by an individual against the Oslo Jewish 
Synagogue who apparently fired an automatic weapon at the structure in “the middle of 
the night.”162  Somehow, the authorities were informed that the synagogue was a 
“terrorist target” allowing an appropriate level of response so that ultimately no injuries 
were reported.  Although there is little evidence that the perpetrator crossed a state border 
to conduct this attack, this event illustrates the fact the GTD perpetrator category labeled 
“Individual” may present some of the same difficulties as the “Unk/Other” category when 
attempting to determine if an attack fits this studies definition of an international incident.   
The only incident within Germany after biometric screening was an attempted 
train bombing conducted by two individuals claiming to work for the terrorist 
organization Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (HT).163  The perpetrators were legally in Germany 
as university students; the primary perpetrator had been in country since 2004, while the 
other entered the country on a student visa the same year of the attack.  The primary 
perpetrator descended from a Lebanese family with known ties to Hizb al–Tahrir and 
interestingly, the perpetrator’s father was under surveillance by the Lebanese government 
presumably from a time well before the individual applied for a German student visa.164  
Fortunately, during the attack, the bombs failed to explode and the authorities were able 
to capture and prosecute both individuals responsible.  The primary perpetrator was 
arrested after attempting to flee back to his home in Lebanon and the other turned himself 
in after prompting by his reputable Lebanese family.165  Although this attack failed due  
 
                                                 
162 GTD dataset event ID# 200609170015. 
163 GTD dataset event ID# 200607310006.  This group is active throughout the Middle East, China, 
and Russia – but little evidence of their existence in Germany.  Global Security, "Hizb Ut-Tahrir Al-Islami 
(Islamic Party of Liberation)," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hizb-ut-tahrir.htm 
(accessed 09 June 2010). 
164 Gunter Latsch and others, "Terrorism in Germany: Every Investigator's Nightmare," Spiegel 
Online International, sec. International Terrorism, 28 August 2006, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,433839,00.html. 
165 Jeffrey Fleishman, "Germany Startled to Find it's A Terror Target," Los Angeles Times, sec. The 
World, 19 August 2006 (accessed 17 September 2010). 
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to the ineptitude of the attackers to successfully ignite their devices, it illustrates some 
key issues with biometric screening programs and the importance of incorporating all 
available information into the screening process. 
In contrast to some of the other attacks in the transition or post-biometric periods, 
this incident in Germany is a good representation of an attack that most likely originated 
externally to the state in question.  While this example closely represents the type attacks 
that biometric screening is intended to thwart, it also illustrates some of the problems 
facing biometric screening programs.  Specifically, this attack shows that biometric 
screening may be largely ineffective against: (1) individuals already in place who do not 
subsequently transit borders; and (2) individuals without any previous terrorist or 
criminal records that can be used in screening.  It follows that terrorist organizations may 
seek to circumvent biometric screening programs by using individuals who are either 
already “in place” or individuals who have clean records that facilitate travel into the 
target state.   
The single unsuccessful attack in Germany during the transition period helped to 
solidify the call for fully integrating all available terrorist and criminal information into 
state databases to better facilitate biometric screening programs (much like HSPD-6 in 
the U.S.)166  It is important to note that Germany and other EU states are still in the 
process of building and expanding their biometric databases and screening processes 
through upgrades to the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II.)167  
Despite the lack of a fully integrated and functional biometric screening process within 
the EU, there are still a few examples of successes that have occurred in recent years.  
One of the most notable German screening success occurred in 2008 when officials foiled 
a significant plot formulated by the Islamic Jihad Union after discovering documented 
                                                 
166 Latsch and others, Terrorism in Germany: Every Investigator's Nightmare. 
167 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on the Development of the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (Brussels: EU, 05 July 
2010), 6, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0221:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed 
27 September 2010). 
 102
travel by certain individuals into and out of Pakistan.168  As the EU states get better at 
sharing and fusing information, there should be continued successes during the screening 
process associated with visa issuance and at border points of entry throughout the EU. 
As suspected at the onset of this analysis, screening procedures during the 
transition period will include a mixture of biometric and non-biometric screening due to 
the amount of time required to fully transition systems and documents over to the new 
biometric requirements.  One potential consideration is whether or not the defined 
duration of the transition period accurately reflects individual state implementation 
procedures (should it be longer/shorter or even individualized when comparing different 
states.)  While this study used a predetermined and fixed time period for all states, follow 
on studies might consider assessing individual states with respect to their program 
implementation and hence tailor the transition period to each individual state.  The 
bottom line is that during this transition period despite the duration, there remains a 
specified period of time where individuals may still have the ability to enter a country 
without being subject to biometric screening and hence countries are not reaping the full 
benefit of biometrically enabled screening processes.  As such, most biometric screening 
programs and the resulting border control should be considered to be relatively porous 
during the transition period.  This is mainly due to the ability of individuals to use 
previously issued documents to travel into a target state. 
For the states that instituted biometric screening programs in 2005, moving past 
the transition period and assessing the post-biometric period is not entirely possible with 
the GTD dataset.  Assessing the post--transition period is limited to only the events that 
occurred in 2007 since the GTD data ends at this point.  Without additional data 
formatted in a similar fashion as the 1991–2007 GTD data, inferences beyond the 
transition period in these states only give a very limited view of the post-biometric 
period.  Although it should be clear that assessing the data within these states in 2007 is 
far from conclusive, it is notable that there are no known attacks in any of the states (with 
                                                 
168 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 Chapter 6–
Terrorist Organizations," (2009), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122449.htm (accessed 09 June 
2010). 
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the exception of the Thailand “Unk/Other Included” dataset.)  Forecasting the longer-
term trends for terrorism in these countries will depend on gathering and processing 
follow-on terrorist incident data as it relates to biometric screening in the same manner as 
was conducted in this study. 




Figure 9.   Biometric Screening—2006 Start Date. 
States that implemented biometric screening programs in 2006 marked the last 
group included in this specific study.  Most of these states were implementing screening 
programs aimed at incorporating the minimum requirements using the available e-
Passport technology standards (mainly including digital facial photographs onto travel 
machine readable visas.)  The U.S. and the states in EU, however, were implementing 
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substantially more intricate systems that combined multiple levels of biometric screening 
capabilities and information sharing.  Some of these programs provided for extensive 
data sharing capabilities both within and externally to the state in question.  Some 
components of these state programs are broken into individual elements that are solely 
based on identity verification and screening such as the US–VISIT and EURODAC 
programs.169 
Another important distinction within this group is the fact that the U.S. and the 
UK had previously initiated some forms of biometric screening for immigrants.  
Specifically, in the U.S., digital fingerprints were being incorporated into the screening 
process as early as 2002.  Unfortunately, these early attempts at biometric screening were 
not as productive due to the lack of a globalized standard for the data format and limited 
information sharing.  Most of the early programs did not have the capacity for the 
required information sharing between internal or external state agencies to accurately 
screen immigrants.  The lack of effective integration and information sharing within and 
between states is one of the main difficulties that prevented some of the early biometric 
screening initiatives from gaining ground and is still costing some states from 
maximizing their programs.  The U.S. and EU move to consolidate terrorist screening 
into a centralized process using electronic media and biometrically searchable databases, 
paved the way for collaboration and integration with several other states. 
Analyzing the activities that occurred in this group of states, there is again an 
initial decrease in the mid 1990s and then fairly steady numbers of incidents throughout 
the rest of the period.  The transition period exceeds the available data within the GTD, 
but it is interesting to note that in the “Unk/Other Excluded,” the U.S. was the only state 
to experience an incident after implementing biometric screening, an event that occurred 
one year after fully implementing biometric screening measures and fully integrated state 
databases.  There is also less of a discrepancy between the two datasets within this group 
                                                 
169 United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–VISIT) and European 
Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) are examples of state specific programs that focus primarily on biometric 
identification and verification.  Baldaccini, Counter-Terrorism and the EU Strategy for Border Security: 
Framing Suspects with Biometric Documents and Databases, 31; U.S. Dept of Homeland Security, US–
VISIT Biometric Identification Services. 
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of states, and both datasets indicate the same general trends of a decreasing number of 
events in the limited biometric periods that are able to be analyzed on these charts.   
In the “Unk/Other Included” dataset, Austria had a single incident and France had 
two separate incidents perpetrated by “Unknown” groups in the transition period.  The 
incident in Austria was an arson event against a Turkish cultural site in Vienna in which 
there were no recorded injuries.170  As with earlier “Unk/Other” incidents, it seems likely 
that this could be perpetrated by a group within Austria that is merely disgruntled with 
the cultural implications of the targeted site.  The incidents in France, however, appear to 
be quite a bit larger in magnitude and are more in-line with what one would expect of an 
international incident.  One incident was a string of bombings in the Basque region, 
which damaged several properties.171  Although this attack was a larger magnitude, there 
is a large presence of separatist Basques within and around this region that have 
traditionally claimed similar attacks, so again this single event may still be indigenous to 
the Basque region.  The other French attack, which occurred in 2007, was a parcel bomb 
sent to a law firm and former work place of President Nicholas Sarkozy, which ultimately 
killed one person and injured five others.172  A Frenchmen was detained shortly after the 
blast for questioning, but a verdict or determination has yet to be released on whether or 
not he is responsible.  Despite the magnitude of the attacks in France, current information 
sheds some doubt on either of these incidents being perpetrated by an external actor.  
Assuming that each of these incidents may have been committed by internal or 
indigenous perpetrators, there would be no incidents within these states after the 
inception of biometric screening. 
Analyzing the “Unk/Other Excluded” dataset also yields similar results.  In this 
dataset of “known” perpetrators, the U.S. was the sole state that experienced an incident 
again occurring during the transition period.  The U.S. incident was the attempted 
bombing of the Mexican Consulate in New York by a lone individual using a fabricated 
                                                 
170 GTD dataset event ID# 200711040002. 
171 GTD dataset event ID# 200704180006. 
172 GTD dataset event ID# 200712060001.  Laure Bretton and Brian Rohan, "One Killed in Paris 
Parcel Bomb Blast," Reuters, sec. World, 06 December 2007, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL067027520071206 (accessed 27 September 2010). 
 106
hand grenade.173  It is suspected that this incident was perpetrated by an individual but 
there is not any information yet as to the suspect’s origin or any publicized claims from 
known terrorist affiliates.  This incident again illustrates the difficulty of the “Individual” 
term within the GTD dataset, as it nearly equates to the same characteristics as the 
“Unk/Other” perpetrator groups.  It was also noted that the circumstances surrounding 
this specific attack appear nearly identical to an earlier incident performed by an 
individual on a bicycle, ultimately suspected to be a local employee.174  Without further 
information on the suspect and according to our classification of events in this study, it is 
not possible to eliminate this event from the dataset, nor is it possible to evaluate the role 
of biometric screening in relation to this incident.  Despite the difficulties in classifying 
terrorist incidents within the GTD dataset, it seems again evident that there are fewer 
events being committed during the transition period than in the prebiometric period. 
As mentioned earlier, the analysis of the relation of terrorist incidents to biometric 
screening initiatives within this specific group of states is somewhat limited by the 
inclusive events within the dataset.  Efforts were made to compare other datasets in order 
to account for the 2008–2009 timeframe, but other events were not classified in the same 
manner as the GTD format, which made numerical comparisons not feasible.  
Incorporating further data with similar fidelity as the GTD dataset will provide more 
conclusive results on whether or not incidents will continue to follow the downward trend 
that is noticeable in the first year of the transition period of this group of states. 
5.  Overall Trends  
The graphical analysis of each state group that initiated biometric borders shows 
some important trends in terrorist incidents in the states that instituted biometric 
screening programs.  Most importantly, the graphical analysis reaffirms the aggregated 
results and shows that states that have implemented biometric screening programs have 
                                                 
173 GTD dataset event ID# 200710260003.  Alison Gendar, Joe Gould and Jonathan Lemire, 
"Explosives Lobbed at Mexican Consulate," NY Daily News, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2007/10/26/2007-10-
26_explosives_lobbed_at_mexican_consulate.html (accessed 09 June 2010). 
174 Michelle Nichols, "Devices Explode at Mexican Consulate in New York," Reuters, sec. News, 26 
October 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2636464720071026 (accessed 04 August 2010). 
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experienced both a decreasing trend of average annual incidents lower overall aggregate 
totals after implementing biometric screening programs.  Analyzing the “Unk/Other 
Included” and the “Unk/Other Excluded” datasets separately allowed for analysis of 
information that could not be conclusively discounted.  Despite the separation of each 
dataset, the trends tended to depict a decrease in incidents over the biometric time periods 
with the exception of Thailand and Pakistan. 
One of the most obvious trends is the dramatic drop in incidents in the mid-1990s 
nearly across the spectrum of subject countries.  The overall raw data from the GTD 
dataset without any manipulations also shows this decreasing trend that begins in the 
1990s, this trend is fairly obvious when looking at the entire GTD dataset depicted in 
graphical form (including all known terrorist incidents across all states.)175  Figure 10 
shows all the terrorist incidents contained in the GTD prior to any manipulation for the 
purpose of this study in order to illustrate the drop in incidents that is clearly evident in 
the 1990s. 
 
Figure 10.   Entire GTD Dataset—All Terrorist Activities (1971–2009). 
 
                                                 
175 START - A Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Global Terrorism 
Database. 
 
Entire GTD Dataset – all recorded terrorist activities from all countries. 
[From http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (accessed 01 June, 2010)] 
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This chart of the entire GTD dataset also depicts an increasing trend in incidents 
from 2001 to the present, but a large majority of that trend can be attributed to Iraq 
alone—with over 4000 incidents.  As most of these incidents are related to the global war 
on terror, if they are discounted, terrorist incidents seem to follow a fairly steady trend.  
Contrasted with this steady trend, this studies aggregate and graphical analysis of the first 
20 states to institute biometric screening shows that many of these states are enjoying a 
decreasing number of terrorist incidents after they instituted biometric screening 
programs.  Additionally, the downward trend in terrorist incidents identified within many 
of these states appears to increase throughout the transition period and post-biometric 
period respectively, with fewer incidents occurring within states as biometric screening 
progresses.  In the “Unk/Other Excluded” dataset, none of the states in this study have yet 
experienced an incident that could be positively attributed to a foreign group in the post-
biometric period.  Overall, the combined result of the aggregate and graphical analysis 
show that the first 20 states to implement biometric screening programs have experienced 
cumulative decreases in incidents perpetrated by “known” foreign perpetrators. 
The most intriguing finding of this analysis is the distinct lack of incidents in the 
post-biometric period across the entire set of states.  Of the first 20 states that  have 
initiated biometric screening programs on or before 2005, none have yet suffered a 
terrorist attack by an external perpetrator in the post-biometric period (through the end of 
the GTD data.)  Obviously, the last group of states is only one year from establishing a 
formal biometric program and not yet out of the transition period, so further analysis will 
be required to substantiate this finding.  This certainly does not indicate that biometric 
screening is the single causal mechanism responsible for the lack of terrorist incidents in 
the post-biometric period, but it should prompt further quantitative analysis of biometric 
screening programs and their potential contribution to countering terrorism across 
international borders. 
D. CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
Thus far, both the aggregate and graphical analysis illustrates that the institution 
of biometric screening programs coincides with a decrease in terrorist incidents during 
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both the transition and post-biometric periods in both datasets.  Another method that may 
help to quantify or measure the strength of the relationship between biometric screening 
programs and terrorist incidents is to perform a statistical analysis of these two variables.  
Performing a statistical correlation between the biometric inception date and measured 
decreases in terrorist incidents for each of the states within our datasets should help 
measure the strength of the relationship and lay the ground work to conclusively attest 
that biometric screening is indeed an import tool in countering international terrorism. 
1. Biometric Screening to Decreases in Terrorist Incidents 
To investigate the correlation between biometric screening and decreases in 
terrorist incidents, this study will again consider both datasets and individually look at 
terrorist incidents before and after each states implemented biometric screening program.  
A statistical correlation will be conducted in order to assess the relationship between the 
number of annual terrorist incidents compared to the presence or absence of a biometric 
screening program based on the assumption that there will be cumulatively fewer annual 
terrorist incidents after biometric screening programs are put in place.  For this method, 
states that experience fewer terrorist incidents after instituting biometric screening 
programs will exhibit stronger correlation scores.  Measuring the strength of these 
relationships will allow for comparison across our sample of state as well as provide 
some evidence that a discernable and measureable relationship exists between biometric 
screening and decreases in international terrorist incidents. 
2.  Coding Dataset 
The first correlation directly compares the average number of terrorist incidents 
per year in each state with the existence of a biometric screening program.  An “annual” 
dummy variable was introduced for each state intended to represent the presence or 
absence of a biometric screening program (“1” = biometric screening program / “0” = no 
biometric screening program.)  Using an annual basis to directly compare with the annual 
incident rates, states received a “1” beginning in the year after they implemented a 
biometric screening program and a “0” for the years before they instituted biometric 
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screening programs.  The correlations between each states paired groupings of incidents 
and biometric program existence were run using S-Plus software.176  With the variables 
coded in this manner, the expected results will be between “-1” and “1”.  Values between 
“-1” to a “0” would indicate the positive correlation between the presence of a biometric 
screening program and a decrease in terrorist activities.  States with values closer to “-1” 
would have much fewer annual terrorist incidents after putting biometric screening 
programs in place.  Positive values from “0” to “1” indicate that there were increases in 
annual terrorist incidents after instituting a biometric screening program.  Essentially 
large negative numbers indicate a stronger correlation and further the hypothesis that the 
presence of a state biometric screening program corresponds with an overall reduced 
number of annual terrorist incidents.  
 
Correlation of Biometric Screening to Annual Terrorist Incidents “Unk/Other Included” 
1998 




Pakistan   -0.0537 
Belgium    -0.4118 
D.Republic -0.3726 
2005 
Australia   -0.3627 
Germany     -0.2791 
New Zealand -0.3225 
Norway      -0.1737 
Sweden      -0.1392 
Thailand     0.8179 
Monaco          N/A 
 
2006 
Austria   -0.0506 
Denmark   -0.0296 
France    -0.2797 
Japan     -0.2786 
Portugal  -0.1846 
Singapore -0.2025 
UK        -0.0221 
U.S.        -0.3074 
Iceland       N/A 
 
Correlation of Biometric Screening to Annual Terrorist Incidents “Unk/Other Excluded” 
1998 





Belgium  -0.3328 
D.Republic   N/A 
2005 
Australia   -0.2091 
Germany     -0.2503 
New Zealand -0.1157 
Norway       0.0272 
Sweden      -0.2142 
Thailand    -0.2988 
Monaco          N/A 
 
2006 
Austria  -0.1541 
Denmark  -0.1177 
France   -0.2062 
Japan    -0.2176 
UK       -0.1650 
U.S.       -0.1839 
Iceland      N/A 
Portugal     N/A 
Singapore    N/A 
Table 12.   Correlations of Screening to Annual Terrorist Incidents. 
This correlation only considers those states that experienced some sort of terrorist 
incident during the 1991–2007 timeframe.  Assessing the correlation results, it is 
immediately apparent that 30 of 33 individual cases indicated at least some correlation 
between the presence of a biometric screening program and a decrease in the annual 
number of terrorist incidents within the state.  Although the preponderance of the 
                                                 
176 Insightful Corp, S-PLUS 8.0 for Windows, Vol. B8052, 2007). 
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correlation data supports the hypothesis that biometric screening programs are coincident 
with decreases in annual terrorist incidents, there are some instances that merit 
discussion.   
3.  Correlation Outliers 
The few states that did not show the expected correlation values were Malaysia 
and Norway in the “Unk/Other Excluded” dataset and Thailand in the “Unk/Other 
Included” dataset.  These states exhibited correlation scores that indicated an increase in 
terrorist incidents after the implementation of biometric screening programs.  The 
positive correlation in Malaysia and Norway both are partly due to the overall small 
number of events within these states, as well as the timing of the attacks.  Both states had 
a relative absence of terrorist incidents before biometric screening implementation and 
then experienced a single incident after the inception of a biometric screening program.  
In each of these states, these events occurred during the transition period and neither has 
since experienced another incident through 2007.  In this case, the positive correlation (or 
increase in terrorist incidents after biometric screening) seems more related to the timing 
of the event rather than truly representing any effect of biometric borders.  In cases such 
as this, where there are so few incidents, examining each case might yield a more 
productive result. 
The Thailand “Unk/Other Included” dataset is also showed a very strong positive 
correlation indicating that there was a marked increase in terrorist incidents after the state 
instituted biometric screening in 2005.  It is again difficult to draw conclusions from this 
dataset due to the fact that 90% of the incidents within this dataset were perpetrated by 
“Unk/Other” actors and may or may not have any relation to biometric screening.  It is 
also very likely that the recent internal political issues and the growing insurgency in 
Thailand may also be partly responsible for this correlation.  Thailand experienced one of 
the most drastic increases in events in this dataset, going from two incidents in 2003 to 
219 in 2007.  On the other hand, the results from the Thailand “Unk/Other Excluded” 
dataset correlation appears more in line with the predicted hypothesis and shows that 
incidents perpetrated by “known” external terrorist groups begin to slightly decline after 
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Thailand instituted biometric screening programs.  While there are an overwhelming 
number of incidents perpetrated by “Unk/Other” actors within Thailand, and overall 
terrorist incidents are on a recent upwards trend, it can be said that incidents by known 
perpetrators that originated externally to the state have declined after implementing 
biometric screening.  
Overall, these results further confirm that the presence of biometric screening is 
coincident with reduced annual averages of international terrorist incidents within nearly 
all of the states in this study.  Although the correlation scores for most states tend to be 
somewhat weak, they still offer evidence of the suspected trend and further reinforce the 
idea that biometric screening may be a contributor to decreasing terrorist incidents within 
these countries.  One obvious conclusion that can be drawn from the presence of a weak 
correlation (as opposed to a stronger correlation) is that biometric screening is most likely 
not the only factor that influences decreases in terrorist incidents.  Judging the overall 
statistical weight of the correlation values must also be put into context with the 
realization that none of these states have experienced any incidents in the post-biometric 
period using the GTD data from 1991–2007.  The distinct lack of any international 
terrorist incidents conducted by known perpetrators in the post-biometric period is 
perhaps the most important finding of this study a fact that certainly appears to support 
the merit of biometric screening as part of a comprehensive program aimed at countering 
or deterring international terrorism. 
E. RESULTS 
This thesis shows that in the analysis of the first 20 states to adopt biometric 
screening programs, almost every state has seen marked decreases in terrorist incidents 
conducted by known foreign individuals who would have crossed a border to perpetrate 
the attack.  It further illustrates perceptible correlations between biometric screening 
programs and decreases in terrorist incidents (both perpetrated by known and 
“Unk/Other” individuals) within almost every state.  Assessed as a whole, the graphical 
and statistical analysis of the GTD data leads to three different findings with respect to 
biometric screening programs.  First, annual averages of terrorist incidents have 
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decreased over the three defined biometric periods for 19 out of 20 states.  Second, no 
states have experienced any incidents in the post-biometric time period.  Finally, there is 
a discernable correlation between the presence of a biometric screening program and a 
decrease in terrorist incidents. 
From the graphical analysis, the finding of greatest relevance to biometric 
screening programs is the incident free post-biometric screening period.  The observed 
decrease in incidents over the defined periods also reinforces the idea that it may take a 
certain amount of time after the implementation of a biometric screening program to 
develop a fully functioning and coherent system.  Although the time periods outlined here 
were based on the anticipated fielding of equipment and the amount of time thought 
necessary to perceive tangible benefits, this study has illustrated that the use of specific 
time periods should be considered for use in assessing biometric screening programs.  
While this analysis produced some interesting findings, they are somewhat limited with 
respect to time as the GTD dataset only extends to 2007.  Further analysis of terrorist 
incident data from 2007 to present is necessary in order to further substantiate these 
findings (assuming it can be similarly formatted and processed.)  In spite of these 
limitations, these results should provide a foundation for future research in order to 
accurately assess the contributions of biometric screening at increasing state security and 
countering international terrorism. 
The correlation of biometric screening programs with aggregate numbers of 
terrorist incidents is also significant since it demonstrates the existence of a distinct 
connection between these two variables.  This approach can be further refined to isolate 
biometric screening from the other programs aimed at countering terrorism and perhaps 
more effectively measure the individual contributions of biometric screening programs.  
Revealing the correlation between biometric screening and numbers of terrorist incidents 
begins to illustrate that inherent ties may exist between these two variables and is one 
step further towards investigation of causation.  These connections certainly do not imply 
that biometric screening programs are solely responsible for the noted reductions in 
terrorist incidents; it should be obvious that biometric screening is simply another tool  
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with the potential to contribute towards this goal.  Further case studies, investigation of 
foiled plots and reassessment as data builds will all be necessary to determine the full 
extent of deterrence from biometric screening.   
While this study is not meant to be a standalone analysis of biometric screening 
initiatives, it does numerically reinforce the notion that biometric screening is an 
important tool that states should use in conjunction with local law enforcement, 
intelligence and robust legal systems to improve counter terrorism efforts.  Ensuring 
verifiable identity and conducting biometric screening is one step in the process of 
countering terrorism within state borders.  Despite the fact that biometric screening 
programs are relatively young and the dataset is somewhat limited with respect to 
currency of events, these findings should certainly encourage the continuation of 
biometric screening initiatives and the development of methods to measure their 
effectiveness in countering international terrorism.  Further analysis will be required as 
more states put biometric identification and screening initiatives in place and the 
programs themselves develop and mature. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis endeavored to provide a comprehensive assessment of biometric 
identification, as it pertains to border security and counter terrorism.  It combined the 
readily available information on biometric identification with the practical applications 
currently used in immigration and border control in order to analyze the contributions of 
biometric identification to state security efforts.  Accurately assessing the effectiveness of 
biometric borders will determine their prevalence within society—as such, this thesis has 
laid the foundations for quantifying the counter terrorism contributions of biometric 
identification systems.  Ultimately, this work shows that there is a definite potential for 
states to achieve real security gains by incorporating biometrics into border control 
programs and state screening mechanisms. 
A. BIOMETRICS IN VERIFABLE IDENTITY 
Biometric identifiers have very unique characteristics, are proprietary to every 
individual, can be difficult to falsify, and are proving to be highly reliable for identity 
verification and screening.  The ability to rapidly and reliably ascertain an individual’s 
identity is undoubtedly becoming an important state security tool.  As states realize 
tangible security benefits from biometric identification programs, many are demanding 
that verifiable identity be provided at their borders.  In addition to biometric identification 
becoming the norm throughout the international community, several states are seeking 
corresponding screening programs to enhance state security.  As states implement 
biometric identifiers into an increasing number of identification programs, particular 
attention needs to be placed on understanding the underlying principles of how the 
identifiers will be used in order to maximize their results.  States should be cognizant of 
the methodology and constraints that underlie biometric technologies in order to develop 
efficient and accurate identification systems.  As verifiable identity becomes more readily 
available, states also need to consider information integration and sharing in order to 
maximize the security measures that are afforded by biometric identification systems. 
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B. ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
In an effort to quantify the role of biometric identification in state security; this 
thesis investigated two distinct biometric initiatives.  The first was an analysis of the U.S. 
visa refusals with respect to the biometric identification initiatives associated with US–
VISIT and the integrated databases under HSPD–6.  The second and more substantial 
assessment was intended to evaluate the contributions of biometric identification 
programs at reducing the number of foreign perpetrated terrorist incidents within a state.  
These assessments both indicated that biometric identification and enhanced screening 
can bolster state security and may protect against international terrorist incidents. 
1. Screening Effectiveness 
Screening individuals throughout the immigration process is beginning to take on 
a much larger importance than ever before and many states have developed biometric 
identification systems in order to accomplish this goal.  These systems can detect 
fraudulent identities, highlight known actors, or assist in prosecution efforts.  Assessing 
the U.S. visa refusals was an effort to investigate the potential contributions of these state 
specific biometrically based screening initiatives.   
As suspected, it appears that U.S. screening enhancements made after 9/11 have 
significantly improved the ability to determine the acceptability of an intending 
immigrant.  Judging both from reported successes as well as the numerical analysis of 
U.S. visa refusals, it is clear that the U.S. has improved the ability to deny a larger 
percentage of U.S. applicants on the basis of security and terrorism concerns.  This is 
largely due to the improved biometric identification and screening capabilities imposed 
after 9/11 through US–VISIT and HSPD–6.  These results are specific to the U.S. but 
have applicability to other states currently in the process of instituting similar screening 
mechanisms.  As these programs are increasingly refined and identifiers more commonly 
shared between states, immigration and border control programs will continue to see 
similar gains in preventing access to unwarranted individuals. 
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2. Biometric Borders Vs. Terrorism 
Measuring the effectiveness of biometric identification against terrorism as a 
whole is a difficult task and receives little attention in the way of large-scale studies.  
This thesis attempted to lay the foundation for a scholarly debate as to the effectiveness 
of state biometric identification programs and their role in countering international 
terrorism.  Biometric borders are a relatively new phenomenon and state specific 
screening procedures are still being developed, yet already there seems to be substantial 
merit.  Focusing on international terrorism, this thesis also found that of the first 20 states 
to implement biometric identification programs, nearly every one experienced 
documented decreases in terrorist activity conducted by foreign nationals within their 
borders.  These decreases were immediate, perceptible, and positively correlated to the 
presence of a biometric program.  More importantly, none of the states has experienced 
an incident by a known foreign perpetrator in the post-biometric period.  Although this 
assessment had some documented limitations due to the available data and duration, it 
substantially reinforces the idea that biometric identification may play a positive role in 
increasing state security against foreign national terrorist attacks. 
3. Follow-on Research 
This thesis has shown perceptible links between biometric identification and state 
security, yet there is ample room to improve this quantitative analysis.  The GTD is only 
one of several terrorist datasets, while comprehensive, it is not exhaustive.  Future efforts 
to quantify terrorist incidents may consider other separate databases to build upon this 
analysis.  There is also room for the investigation of the numerous foiled terrorist plots 
with respect to biometric identification.  Within the U.S. alone, the Heritage Foundation 
reports that to date, there have been 28 foiled terrorist plots.177  Investigating the 
biometric screening implications of these attacks may provide further insights on whether 
or not biometrics played a role in any respect.  Other potentially worthwhile endeavors 
                                                 
177 Jena McNeill, "Detroit Terror Plot Makes 28 Plots Foiled since 9/11," The Heritage Foundation 
WebMemo #2741 (2009), http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/wm2741.cfm (accessed 11 
March 2010). 
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could be investigating biometric screening as it relates to those within our borders—
obviously this brings up several civil rights concerns and ample fourth amendment 
questions that need to be adequately weighed and addressed. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Surprisingly, much of the literature on biometric identification tends to critique 
and discourage the widespread implementation of biometrics in state security programs.  
On the contrary, this thesis has provided evidence that should encourage further 
development, integration, and analysis of biometric identification in state identification 
programs.  Biometric identifiers offer substantial gains in solving the identity problem 
and can be applied in numerous ways to increase security.  States not currently using 
biometric identification programs as part of a comprehensive security strategy should 
carefully reconsider the potential benefits of biometric identification.  Similarly, internal 
state identification programs should explore the options that biometric incorporation 
could provide in strengthening verifiable identity and improving current screening 
functions. 
Considering the readily available biometric travel documents and the perceptible 
security gains associated with e–Passport program, it is surprising that more states are not 
choosing to implement biometric identification.  The results of this study, as well as the 
publicized successes of these programs, all suggest that states can achieve tangible 
security gains from merely complying with existing standards.  The ability to share 
identification date will also become a premium and states need to consider agreements 
that will enable cooperative watchlisting.  Creating an integrated system should leave 
little room for international criminals or terrorists to hide when attempting to transit state 
borders. 
As biometric identifiers become further incorporated into state immigration and 
border control programs, there also seems to be a commensurate interest in national 
biometric identification programs.  These localized efforts are aimed at improving 
internal state identification processes.  The EU has undertaken efforts to create a 
biometrically enabled national ID card and the U.S. has been debating similar initiatives 
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through the REAL ID Act.178  Based on the capabilities of biometric identifiers and their 
success when paired with appropriate systems, it seems that these initiatives should 
consider incorporating biometrics as a method of enhancing the reliability of state 
identification programs.  In addition to enhancing verifiable identity, the ability to fuse 
information on wanted individuals should correspondingly lead to more effective law 
enforcement. 
Overall, it seems that biometric borders are providing real security gains by 
allowing states to access and utilize verifiable identity.  As these systems become further 
integrated and accuracies improve, the propensity for criminals and terrorists to 
advantage personal identity will be dramatically reduced.  Biometric identification is only 
a small part of a comprehensive security strategy and needs to be seamlessly incorporated 
with other security measures.  Aside from falsification, the next potential avenue that 
individuals may pursue to avoid biometric identification in accomplishing criminal or 
terrorist activities is illegal immigration or taking advantage of individuals with “trusted” 
identities.  While it is near impossible to prevent the first–time offender, biometric offers 
states a much better system to track and record known individuals.  The ability of states 
to leverage identity is another layer of security when it comes to protecting borders and 
ensuring state security. 
                                                 
178 Janice Kephart, "Repealing REAL ID? Rolling Back Driver's License Security," Center for 
Immigration Studies: Backgrounder (June 2009), http://www.cis.org/realid (accessed 13 October 2009). 
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